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I. INTRODUCTION

In his 2006 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush
called on Congress to address the federal government's deficit problem by enacting a line item veto.1 The House of Representatives
passed a version of his proposal in June 2006; in the Senate, the
measure was reported out of committee favorably but then failed to
receive2 a floor vote before the end of the Republican-led 109th Congress.
Since the Democrats took control of Congress in January
2007, President Bush has continued to call for enactment of the proposal, and some members of Congress (mostly Republicans, but a few3
it.
prominent Democrats as well) remain committed to some form of

Legislation has once again been introduced.4
Someone observing these events from a distance could quite reasonably wonder what all of these people are thinking. Do they not
recall that Congress enacted a line item veto statute a decade ago,
and that the Supreme Court soon thereafter struck it down in Clinton

1
2

George W. Bush, U.S. President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 31, 2006), in N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at Al8.
The House version was House Bill 4890, H.R. 4890, 109th Cong. (2006). House Bill
4890's companion bill in the Senate was Senate Bill 2381, S. 2381, 109th Cong. (2006).
The version reported out by the Senate Budget Committee, S. 3521, 109th Cong. (2006),
packaged together several other budget reforms along with the new line item veto measure. See generally S. REP. NO. 109-283 (2006) (recommending the passage of S. 3521, as
amended); VIRGINIA A. MCMURTRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO
ACT OF 2006:

3

4

BACKGROUND AND COMPARISON OF VERSIONS

(2006), http://opencrs.

cdt.org/rpts/RL33517-20060705.pdf (comparing the details of the various bills).
See George W. Bush, Op-Ed., What the Congress Can DoforAmerica,WALL ST.J.,Jan. 3, 2007,
at A13; Elana Schor, Gregg, DeMint Plan To Revive PresidentialLine-Item Veto Bid, HILL, Jan.
9, 2007, http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/gregg-demint-plan-to-revive-presidentialline-item-veto-bid-2007-01-09.html (describing attempts to pass a line item veto as a "conservative perennial," while also noting that Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) has supported
some form of line item veto).
See, e.g., S. 1186, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Sen. Russell Feingold (D-Wis.));
H.R. 1998, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Rep. Paul Ryan (R-Wis.)); H.R. 689, 110th
Cong. (2007) (same).
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v. City of New York?' Do they think that a new Supreme Court might
see matters differently than the Court did a decade ago?
The explanation for this seemingly strange behavior is that the
new "line item veto" the President and legislators have in mind is very
different from the one that the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a decade ago. In truth, it is not really any type of "veto" at all,
for it does not allow the President unilaterally to cancel any provision
of law. The proposed statute would, however, restructure the legislative process in an attempt to achieve similar effects. In particular, it
would allow the President to pull together lists of "wasteful" spending
projects and tax breaks from recently enacted laws, temporarily suspend the targeted items, and then present the lists to Congress for a
speedy up-or-down re-vote. The proposed mechanism would regulate
each house's parliamentary procedures in great detail; amendments
to the President's lists are barred, as are filibusters and other dilatory
tactics. The targeted spending and tax items are not rescinded unless
both houses approve the President's list. In other words, the new socalled line item veto does not let the President unilaterally amend
any law but instead employs the Constitution's ordinary process of bicameral passage and presentment, albeit in a procedurally privileged
and streamlined form that is meant to promote the enactment of
presidential rescissions. According to supporters, this mechanism is
similar in effect to a line item veto and yet evades the Clinton v. City of
New York holding.
So, the new proposal is not really a line item veto, or indeed any
type of veto. Nor is it completely new, though it is currently enjoying
renewed popularity. This type of mechanism, often called "expedited
rescission," has in fact been proposed on a number of occasions, both
before and after the Line Item Veto Act of 1996.6 The expedited rescission approach seems likely to continue to attract interest, at least
as long as politicians want to be seen as doing something about
budget deficits and a true line item veto remains off the table. For
reasons I will explain later, it should prove especially popular the
next time the same party controls both Congress and the presidency.
Expedited rescission raises a number of legal and policy questions
worthy of study. One question, which figures prominently in con-

5

524 U.S. 417 (1998).

6

See H.R. REP. No. 109-505, pt. 2, at 10-12 (2006) (describing various proposals for expedited rescission); H.R. REP. No. 109-505, pt. 1, at 26-27 (2006) (same); S. REP. No. 10414, at 1-5 (1995) (same). The House of Representatives previously passed expedited rescission proposals in 1993 and 1994.
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gressional hearings and committee reports, is whether expedited rescission truly would, as supporters claim, survive the constitutional
holding in Clinton v. City of New York.7 But that is not the most interesting question that expedited rescission raises. Indeed, it is not even
the most interesting purely legal question that expedited rescission
raises.
The most compelling purely legal question about expedited rescission, I would submit, is not the validity of the statute that results
when Congress follows the special procedures, but instead whether
Congress is really required to follow the procedures in the first place.
As explained below, it turns out that Congress cannot be required to
follow the statutory procedures-and not just because the matter is
nonjusticiable, such that no court would order Congress to do so.
Rather, on the constitutional merits, it is impermissible for a statute
to dictate congressional procedure in the way that statutes characteristically bind their objects. (This is somewhat ironic, of course, given

that the whole point of the new law is supposedly to require quick upor-down votes.) Thus, rather paradoxically, the expedited rescission
framework is constitutional only because Congress can choose to ignore it.

The most interesting questions about expedited rescission,
though, concern not so much constitutional doctrine per se but instead the institutional dynamics that surround the statute. To begin
with, why would Congress want to pass such unenforceable legislation
at all? If, as seems likely, much of the answer is that Congress will
sometimes follow the special procedures in practice, then that raises a
second set of questions concerning the institutional circumstances in
which we should expect to see compliance. Once we determine how
expedited rescission is likely to work in practice, we will be in a better
position to discern the true purposes of this puzzling legislation.
These questions are important not just for purposes of understanding the expedited rescission proposals that are now in the news,
but because they also have broader significance. Although it may
seem strange that Congress would attempt to deal with overspending
by using a statute that would intrude on the details of its parliamentary procedures-matters that each house typically governs through
its own standing rules and other unilateral means-Congress has in
fact taken this same approach of "statutizing" its rules in an increasing number of other important contexts. A prominent example of
7

See infra Part I.C (discussing congressional findings regarding the constitutionality of
expedited rescission).
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such regimes of statutory governance of parliamentary procedure is
the "fast track" legislation governing congressional consideration of
trade agreements. Under the fast track parliamentary rules, all of
which are set forth by statute, 8 the President submits a bill implementing a proposed trade agreement, and committee action and
floor votes are then mandated within a fixed number of days (effectively preventing filibusters in the Senate). Various dilatory motions
are deemed out of order, and the implementing bill cannot be
amended. Statutory frameworks governing debate are now used in a
growing number of areas ranging from review of new agency regulations to closures of military bases. 9 The new line item veto proposal
essentially carries over this fast track approach to the context of
budgetary rescission requests. The proliferation of these streamlined
statutory frameworks that sidestep the usual legislative process
repre10
sents an important phenomenon for students of Congress.
This Article has the dual aims of examining the legal issues surrounding the new line item veto proposal and exploring some of the
institutional dynamics it is likely to reflect and promote." Part II pro8
9

10

11

The fast track procedures described in this paragraph are set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 2191
(2000).
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 631-645a (2000) (congressional budget process); 2 U.S.C. §§ 658d685e (2000) (legislation containing unfunded mandates); 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2000) (legislation that nullifies agency regulations); 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (2000) (executive reorganization plans); 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(h) (2000) (Senate rules for legislation adjusting the status
of certain aliens); 15 U.S.C. § 719f (2000) (procedures for approving presidential determinations concerning Alaskan natural gas pipelines); 16 U.S.C. § 1823 (2000) (procedures for disapproving international fisheries agreements); 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (2000) (fast
track for trade agreements); 29 U.S.C. § 1306b (procedures for considering Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation premium revisions); 42 U.S.C. § 2210i (2000) (procedures
for nuclear accident compensation legislation); 42 U.S.C. § 6249c (2000) (legislation implementing certain petroleum contracts); 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (2000) (procedures for terminating presidentially declared states of emergency); National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2908, 104 Stat. 1485, 1816-18 (1990)
(military base closures).
These statutes have recently begun to attract increased scholarly interest. See generally
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes To Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of
Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345 (2003) (evaluating fast track
rules and providing an alternative theoretical framework for understanding related constitutional concerns); Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717 (2005) (exploring the purposes of, and necessary conditions
for, "framework legislation," which creates rules that structure congressional lawmaking);
Charles Tiefer, How To Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws About Lawmaking in 2001, 17J.L. &
POL. 409 (2001) (highlighting the impact of streamlined rules on high-stakes budget controversies); Adrian Vermeule, The ConstitutionalLaw of CongressionalProcedure, 71 U. CHI.
L. REv. 361, 427-31 (2004) (discussing potential rationales for rule-prescribing statutes).
I previously noted some of the interesting features of expedited rescission in an online,
editorial-length posting for the Yale Law JournalPocket Part. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
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vides a context for understanding the new expedited rescission proposal by explaining the problem that expedited rescission is supposed
to solve and briefly discussing previous failed solutions to that problem. It undertakes an initial analysis of expedited rescission, presenting both its purported policy rationale and the legal case for why the
expedited procedures would pass constitutional muster under Clinton
v. City of New York.
Having explored expedited rescission's rationale and purported
advantages, the rest of the Article then takes a more critical look at
the proposal. Part III considers the question of whether Congress is
actually required to follow the expedited procedures, arguing that
Congress is not required to do so for two reasons. First, tucked away
in the new proposal itself is surprising statutory language that allows
each house of Congress to change the rules by unilateral action, thus
undoing the supposed commitment to consider the President's proposals on the fast track. Second, even without that language, each
house possesses a constitutional right to change its own rules, notwithstanding any statute. Given that congressional compliance with
the statutized rule is legally nonobligatory, Part IV then turns to a
consideration of the purposes of this peculiar statute. As the analysis
there shows, past statutized rules often (though not always) attract
compliance despite their nonbinding nature. Once we determine
how this framework would actually be expected to work in practice, I
suspect we will find that its real purpose is not-or is at least not
only-the "good government" purpose that supporters advertise.
Nor is it merely symbolic. Instead, the statute likely has distinctly partisan goals as well. This Part also discusses how these conclusions are
useful not just for understanding expedited rescission, but also as a
way of appreciating the whys and hows of the phenomenon of statutized rules more generally. Finally, it explains how the expedited rescission proposal would differ in practice from a more conventional
line item veto.
II.

THE ALLURE OF EXPEDITED RESCISSION

Expedited rescission has a number of features that make it attractive to budget reformers. This Part explains the political and legal
theory behind expedited rescission and, looking more broadly, shows

The New Line Item Veto Proposal: This Time It's Constitutional (Mostly), 116 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 84 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/2006/10/03/bruhl.html.

Mar. 2008]

RETURN OF THE LINE ITEM VETO?

how such fast track mechanisms can provide an attractive way for
Congress to divide authority between itself and the President.
A. The Problem and PreviousAttempted Solutions
Expedited rescission could be viewed as the latest in a series of attempts to deal with deficits and other budget maladies through structural innovations, an effort that has generated foundational legislation such as the congressional budget framework. 2 But this effort has
also run into constitutional difficulties on several occasions. 3 The interest in structural innovations may well reflect a belief that the "ordinary" legislative process is dysfunctional: left to its own devices,
Congress and its members will prove unable to deal with pressing and
sensitive matters, like the budget, in a responsible and timely manner. In that regard, frameworks like expedited rescission may represent another aspect of what the political scientist Barbara Sinclair
calls "unorthodox lawmaking" in Congress-the increasing use of
procedures that sidestep the familiar model portrayed in civics texts. 4
The various incarnations of the line item veto are often touted as
general deficit reduction measures, but they are actually narrower
than that. Typically, they have not been aimed at the extremely expensive, but popular, existing entitlement programs (such as Social
Security or Medicare) that represent the most difficult part of the
budget problem on the spending side. 5 Nor have they been aimed at
increasing revenues through across-the-board tax increases. Rather,
the line item veto is advertised as targeting "pork," which is a politi-

12

2 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (2000).

13

In addition to striking down the 1996 Line Item Veto Act in Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417 (1998), the Supreme Court declared a portion of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act's deficit-control mechanism unconstitutional in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
Finally, one aspect of the 1974 Impoundment Control Act contained an unconstitutional
legislative veto. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50.

14

See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING:

15

IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (2d ed. 2000). Of course, structural innovations in the budget
context are certainly not a recent phenomenon. See generally CHARLES H. STEWART III,
BUDGET REFORM POLITICS: THE DESIGN OF THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS IN THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1865-1921 (1989). Thus, the budget process has long been more
unorthodox than other aspects of the legislative process.
See DANIEL SHAVIRO, Do DEFICITS MATTER? 289-93 (1997) (noting that, in general, the

NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES

1996 legislation did not involve multi-year entitlements, such as Social Security); see also
DONALD B. MARRON, ACTING DIR., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO's COMMENTS ON S. 2381,
THE LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT OF 2006 at 3, 6 (2006), http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/71xx/doc7177/05-02-LineltemVeto.pdf (noting the budgetary impact of auto-

matic spending increases in large entitlement programs).
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cally salient-even if not the most quantitatively importantcomponent of the budget problem.
Later I will discuss whether a line item veto is truly the cure for
the "pork" problem, and, if it is not, what a line item veto is actually
for. I should also emphasize at the outset that concepts like "wasteful" spending and "pork" are often in the eye of the beholder. Further, any particular line item veto mechanism (or similar measure)
might, as actually drafted, permit the President to attack broad-based
spending programs like Head Start and much else-not only the
"bridge to nowhere" earmarks and exquisitely tailored tax loopholes
that are cited as the mechanism's justification. For the moment,
however, we will put those matters to one side and accept the standard lore regarding why a line item veto is needed. The standard
case for a line item veto posits that pork-more neutrally, spending
items and tax breaks with narrow, particularized benefits-is plentiful
and normatively bad (at least for the most part) and needs to be reduced.

In simplified terms, the story runs as follows:1 6 If Congress

passed a bill composed only of a spending program or special tax
break that the President deemed wasteful, he could veto it. But this is
not how Congress typically legislates. Instead, legislators attach extraneous material as riders, and Congress often passes massive omnibus bills that cover several distinct subject areas and include many discrete policies and programs. Members of Congress have incentives to
include narrow spending or tax cut measures that benefit their constituents, or that please their campaign contributors, but do not
promote the overall public good. Members gain support for their
own narrow programs by agreeing to support their colleagues' programs, leading to bills larded with wasteful items. The President, who
represents a nationwide constituency and is therefore supposed to be
less inclined toward such narrow special-interest measures, would like
to veto some of those items. But since they are rolled together in the
same bill along with measures he deems essential to the national interest, he must hold his nose and sign the whole bill. (In order to get
funding for operations in Afghanistan, for example, he might have to

16

As noted, the usual description of the "pork" problem contains a number of assumptions
that are highly contested; these include the motivations of legislators, the comparative fiscal virtue of the President as compared to Congress, and so forth. SeeJide Nzelibe, The
Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217 (2006)
(questioning the assumption that Congress pursues narrow, parochial interests); Thomas
0. Sargentich, The Future of the Item Veto, 83 IOWA L. REV. 79, 119-35 (1997) (critiquing
the standard policy case for the line item veto-that the President is particularly well
suited to the task of cutting wasteful spending).
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swallow funding for a useless bridge in a remote corner of Alaska.)
Through its bundling together of disparate legislative items, the legislature can effectively nullify the President's veto. The results are increased deficits and the misallocation of funds-thus the need for the
line item veto, which permits the President to strike out offensive
items while still accepting the rest of the bill. Or, as one commentator encapsulates the argument, "Congress is inherently pork-ridden
whereas the President is not,1 and
therefore we should give the Presi7
pork.
veto
to
power
the
dent
There are, of course, other mechanisms besides a true line item
veto that could address the same underlying problem, and current
law provides one such solution in the form of provisions of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ("1974 Act")."' The 1974 Act includes, among many other things, a mechanism for Congress to reconsider possibly ill-advised spending decisions. In particular, it
allows the President to freeze certain appropriated sums for a period
of forty-five days, during which Congress is invited to reconsider
them.' 9 If Congress finds the President's proposed rescission meritorious, it can enact a rescission bill that the President then signs like
any other piece of legislation. If Congress fails to act on the President's rescission proposals, the original spending legislation remains
in force and the funds are expended. °
The 1974 Act is limited in some respects, including that Congress
can simply ignore the President's suggestions and go about its business. 21 The President merely proposes that Congress act but, as usual,
has no direct control over the legislative agenda. (Mechanisms such
as the expedited rescission proposal at issue in this Article, we will
see, are intended to remedy this perceived defect by requiring congressional action at the President's behest.) In other words, the
forces of inertia and inaction are on the side of spending rather than
rescinding funds. Further, under the 1974 Act, legislators can amend
the President's proposals like any other bill. This, of course, runs the
17
18

19
20
21

Sargentich, supra note 16, at 125. Note that Sargentich is describing this view but not endorsing its accuracy.
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (2000). There are other institutional arrangements that serve
similar functions. For example, many states have "single subject" rules in their constitutions. See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L.
REv. 803, 804 (2006).
2 U.S.C. §§ 683, 688.
Id. § 683(b).
See S. REP. No. 104-10, at 1 (1995) ("While the [1974 Act] provided legislative procedures
for the consideration of the President's proposed spending reductions in a rescission bill,
Congress has routinely ignored these procedures.").
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risk of defeating the purpose of allowing the President to pick out
wasteful items that he believes Congress would eliminate if considered on their own merits. Presidents have used the rescission procedures in the 1974 Act sparingly (especially in recent administrations),
and Congress has not enacted most of the President's proposals."
The next important step in the budget story, for our purposes,
came in 1996. In the debates that eventually yielded the Line Item
Veto Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), Congress considered a number of
veto-like proposals ranging from the expedited rescission approach
now at issue to a "separate enrollment" proposal under which massive
spending bills would be divided into hundreds of separate bills so
that each would be separately susceptible to the President's veto
pen.22 The legislation that eventually emerged was a variety of what is
sometimes called enhanced rescission (as opposed to the expedited rescission at issue now). The 1996 Act gave the President the authority
to unilaterally "cancel" discretionary budget authority, new direct
spending, or focused tax breaks by sending a message to Congress
within five days after signing the bill containing the items to be cancelled.24 Congress could overturn the President's cancellations only if
it affirmatively enacted a disapproval bill through the Article I, Section 7 process.25 Congressional inaction thus favored spending cuts.
Moreover, because the President would be expected to veto any bill
disapproving of his proposed cancellations, reversing the President's
cancellation decision would require a two-thirds supermajority in
each house. In sum, the 1996 Act loaded the dice heavily in favor of
the President's cancellations succeeding.

22

23

24
25

See generally MARRON, supra note 15, at 1-4. From 1976 to 2005, Presidents proposed rescission of only about $73 billion out of over $15 trillion in discretionary spending in that
period (about 0.5%), and Congress enacted only about one-third of those proposals (in
dollar terms). Id. at 2. More rescissions have been initiated by Congress itself-about
$142 billion over the period. Id.
See Elizabeth Garrett, The Story of Clinton v. City of New York: Congress Can Take Care of
Itself in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 46, 58-60 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (discussing
alternatives considered in the 1996 debate). For discussions of the legality of separate
enrollment provisions, see Eugene Gressman, Observation, Is the Item Veto Constitutional?,
64 N.C. L. REV. 819, 821-22 (1986), and Sargentich, supra note 16, at 91-92.
Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 1200, 1200 (1996).
Id. § 2(a), 110 Stat. at 1202. The statute created special streamlined procedural rules for
considering disapproval bills that are not unlike the expedited procedures for considering approval bills under the new expedited rescission approach. See id. § 2(a), 110 Stat. at
1203-07.
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The question of the constitutionality of the 1996 Act reached the
Supreme Court in Clinton v. City of New York. 26 The parties challenging the line item veto raised a number of arguments sounding in the
separation of powers, but Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court
rested on the narrower ground that the cancellation procedure violated Article I, Section 7's requirement of bicameralism and presentment.27 According to the 1996 Act's definitions, "cancel" meant
"to prevent.., from having legal force or effect.,2 s By exercising the
cancellation authority, the Court concluded, "the President has
amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each." And
that is of course impermissible because the amendment or repeal of
statutes is not given unto the President alone, but rather can be effected only by going through the full process of bicameralism and
presentment. 0 Q.E.D.
The three dissenters (Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Breyerstrange bedfellows both politically and methodologically) concluded
that the President had not amended any statute nor, despite the 1996
Act's name, engaged in a forbidden "line item veto.0 1 Instead, Congress had simply delegated to the President the authority to decide
whether to spend or collect certain money. In other words, the 1996
Act provided that certain parts of tax and spending bills could henceforth be considered options that the President could carry out or not,
as he chose. By choosing, he was executing the given statute-

26

524 U.S. 417 (1998). The previous year, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the Act
brought by legislators who opposed it; their suit was dismissed on the ground that the legislators lacked Article III standing. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997).

27

Clinton, 524 U.S. at 447-48; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.2 ("Every Bill which shall have
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not
he shall return it.... ."). Justice Kennedy's concurrence relied on broader themes of

separation of powers. See generally Clinton, 524 U.S. at 449-53 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
28

§ 2(a), 110 Stat. at 1207. That definition of "cancel" applied to items of direct spending
and limited tax benefits. Id. In the context of discretionary budget authority, "cancel"
was defined as "rescind." Id. There is a greater history of presidential rescission of discretionary budget authority than there is of the cancellations of the type at issue in the Clin-

ton case. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 465-68 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
29

524 U.S. at 438.

30

Id. (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983)).

31

See generally id. at 453-69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 46997 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's dissent also concluded that some of the challengers lacked standing, so he did not reach the merits as to those parties.

(Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Id. at 463
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following it, not amending it.32 Although the Constitution does im-

pose some minimal restraints on the legislature's ability to delegate
policymaking authority to the executive, the dissenters found this
delegation well within the bounds that historical practice and the
Court's precedents had set.33 The dissenters did not believe the 1996
Act violated any other principle of the separation of powers.34 But
their view did not carry the day, and so ended the previous experiment with the line item veto.
B. The Theory of Expedited Rescission
As noted above, current law already provides a process whereby
the President can temporarily withhold funds while Congress considers his proposal to rescind certain spending items. The current line
item veto proposal is similar in that it too requires that Congress affirmatively endorse the President's suggested rescissions. Nonetheless, it would work a subtle but potentially important change in current law. As a committee report explains, under the 1974 Act's
rescission process, "Congress can simply ignore presidential rescissions. ' That is, there is no requirement that Congress actually consider the President's rescission proposals, and Congress could also
amend them and package them in ways that frustrate passage, thus

32

Id. at 474-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 469 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("The title of the Line Item Veto Act, which was perhaps designed to

simplify for public comprehension, or perhaps merely to comply with the terms of a campaign pledge, has succeeded in faking out the Supreme Court."); Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO
L. REv. 871, 877-78 (1999) (criticizing the Court's invalidation of the 1996 Act because
the Court mistakenly equated the 1996 Act to a traditional line item veto). The expedited
rescission mechanism under discussion here is even farther from a true line item veto, of

33

34
35
36

course.
See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 484-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting). On the nondelegation doctrine,
see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 31923 (2d ed. 2002), and LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-19 (3d
ed. 1999).
See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 480-84 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
See supratext accompanying notes 18-20.
H.R. REP. No. 109-505, pt. 1, at 12 (2006); see also S. REP. No. 104-14, at 2 (1995) (stating
that under the 1974 Act "[i]t frequently happens that special messages submitted by the
President to rescind funds receive no action at all by Congress"). It should be noted that
the committee reports are political documents meant to illustrate the need for expedited
rescission and, accordingly, do not necessarily give a complete account of the history.
While it is true that Congress can ignore presidential rescission requests, that is not the
only reason why presidential rescissions under existing law have not amounted to much.
Presidents have not requested much, and Congress sometimes simply prefers (and enacts) different rescissions than those the President proposes. See supra note 22.
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defeating to some degree the purpose of letting the President submit
a remedial rescission proposal in the first place. Current law provides
an opportunity for quick action iflegislators want it,37 but does not
mandate it.
The expedited rescission approach, in contrast, "requires Congress
to vote up or [down] on a stand-alone bill containing the items the
President seeks to cancel. ' 8 In repeated uses of mandatory language,
the new legislation states that the President's approval bill "shall" be
introduced within five days of the President's message transmitting
his proposed rescissions 9 and provides that the committee "shall report it to the House without amendment not later than the seventh
legislative day after the date of its introduction. 4 0 The rules of floor

debate are regulated in detail to provide for speedy consideration.4'
Amendments are barred.42
One might wonder why the above mandates are necessary. If Congress favors certain rescissions on the merits it can pass them, the
thinking would run, and if Congress does not favor them it will vote
against them in the final vote, regardless of the special procedure.
The response is that expedited rescission would work by manipulating political visibility and accountability. Legislators have a number
of tools at their disposal that can reduce the profile of legislative activity and deflect accountability: omnibus bills, complex procedural
votes, delay, delegation to executive agencies, and so on. Expedited
rescission seeks to simplify and make salient what might otherwise be
obscured. The theory of expedited rescission is that wasteful items

37
38

39

40
41
42

See 2 U.S.C. § 688(b) (2000). This section in effect creates an optional "semi-fast track"
procedure.
H.R. REP. No. 109-505, pt. 1, at 13. The new legislation differs from current law in other
ways as well, such as by adding direct spending and targeted tax benefits to the list of
items that can be proposed for rescission; current law covers only budget authority in appropriations measures. Id. at 21-22.
H.R. 4890, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (proposed amendment to § 1012(a) (1) of Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974). As noted earlier, there were a
few different expedited rescission bills under consideration in the last Congress, which
differ in some particulars. See MCMURTRY, supra note 2, at 6-8 (comparing the details of
the various bills). I will typically cite H.R. 4890 as passed by the House, but the analysis
presented herein applies to the general approach and does not depend on the various
details.
H.R. 4890, § 2 (proposed amendment to § 1012(a) (2) (A) of Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act).
Id. (proposed amendment to § 1012(a)(2)-(3) of Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act).
Id. (proposed amendment to § 1012(b) of Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act).
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would not be enacted if they had to stand on their own in a re-vote,
severed from the desirable piece of legislation to which they were attached. 43 Unlike under a true line item veto, the President cannot
cancel them unilaterally, but expedited rescission is designed to
achieve that result through forced public "position taking.",44 Without
the excuse that a certain pork-laden bill was necessary because it also
provided for ongoing military operations, would legislators still be
able to vote for million-dollar crawfish research institutes named after
themselves? 45 The theory of expedited rescission, at least, is that they
would not be able to take such a stand. Moreover, beyond the results
of any particular vote, the risk that one's own frivolous special project
could be presented in a rescission bill, thus raising its profile, can itself act to deter wasteful measures. 46
The bar on amending the President's proposals is, obviously, crucial to the success of expedited rescission. If the wasteful projects

43

See H.R. REP. NO. 109-505, pt. 1, at 13 ("This bill provides another opportunity to expose
such [special interest] measures to scrutiny. If they can stand on their own merits, they
will survive."). As explained below, the President need not put all the wasteful items from
a bill into the same rescission package; rather, he can create several separate lists to be
voted upon separately. See infra text accompanying notes 99-100.

44

The notion of position taking as a species of legislative activity is most closely associated
with David Mayhew. Some position taking is voluntary in the sense that a legislator can
take a position or not, but voting (especially roll call voting) is less voluntary. See DAVID R.
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 61-66 (2d ed. 2004); see also Benjamin Highton & Michael S. Rocca, Beyond the Roll-Call Arena: The Determinants of Position
Taking in Congress, 58 POL. RES. Q. 303, 304 (2005) (explaining that "roll-calls effectively
'require' that a position be taken").

45

In his 1988 State of the Union Address, President Reagan famously claimed that with a
line item veto he could cut millions of dollars in wasteful spending on items such as cranberry and crawfish research projects. See Ward Sinclair & Tom Kenworthy, Hill's Cranberry
and Crawfish Crowd Choleric,WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1988, at A17.

46

Cf Garrett, supra note 32, at 925-32 (discussing the informational effect of cancellation
procedures). As noted earlier, some of the assumptions underlying the standard policy
case for expedited rescission (and all item vetoes more generally) are highly debatable.
Here, one should note the possibility that legislators would be proud to have their special
interest projects highlighted, because their contributors and key constituents like those
"wasteful" projects. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. I note as well that increasing the public visibility of particular votes does pose some risks, as greater transparency also makes it even easier for rent-seeking interest groups to monitor and then punish or reward legislators. See generally Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Transparency
in the U.S. Budget Process, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO
BUDGET POLICY 68 (Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy & Howell E. Jackson eds.,
2008). These groups, however, already possess enough incentives and organization to
monitor how their interests fare in the markup sessions and other bargaining that goes
into creating a thick bill-processes that are relatively more opaque to the unorganized
general public. The high salience of a rescission vote therefore tends to erode interest
groups' relativeadvantage in information.
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could be repackaged or linked with other measures, the same pathologies that generated the bloated bill in the first place could simply reappear at the rescission stage. This attentiveness to the dynamics of legislative packaging and logrolling is characteristic of a
number of schemes of statutized rules. The framework governing
closure of military bases, for example, bars amendments to the executive's list of facilities slated for closure; every member of Congress has
powerful incentives to try to remove the facility in his or her own district from the list, so the package is presented to Congress as an unamendable whole.47
The theory behind expedited rescission can also be appreciated
on a more generalized theoretical level by considering how this device compares to another method of structuring executive-legislative
interactions, the legislative veto. The legislative veto lets Congress,
one house, or even one committee nullify the executive's decisions by
passing a disapproval resolution (i.e., "vetoing" the executive action).
It is easy to see why the legislative veto was so popular, for it essentially lets Congress have its cake and eat it too.48 It lets Congress delegate broad policymaking authority to the executive ex ante, which has
the usual advantages of saving Congress time, allowing it to avoid
controversial decisions, and taking advantage of agency expertise.
But, at the same time, it gives Congress much greater ex post control
than would be possible if the only way to override the executive's decision were to go through the full dress Article I, Section 7 process of
passing a new statute. (Passing the new statute, incidentally, would
likely require a two-thirds majority, since the President could be expected to veto a bill that attempted to overturn his administration's
prior decision.) And greater control means more confidence in larger and more numerous delegations.
Given the legislative veto's evident attractions, it should come as
no surprise that it, too, was once called into duty as a way of dealing
with the deficit problem. In particular, the 1974 Act created (in addition to the rescission procedures discussed already) a scheme
whereby the President could unilaterally defer spending money

47

48

On the dynamics of the base closure process, see Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 481-82
(1994) (Souter,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), and Garrett, supra note 10, at 760.
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (explaining how
the legislative veto has become the "central means by which Congress secures the accountability of executive and independent agencies"); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473, 477-78 (1984) (explaining factors contributing to the legislative veto's popularity).
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within the fiscal year, subject to legislative veto by a resolution passed
by either chamber of Congress. Of course, when the legislative veto
was declared unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, that also doomed the50
1974 Act's deferral procedures and their one-house legislative veto.

Thus, the legislative veto, just like the 1996 Act's approach, is off the
table when it comes to structural innovations aimed at curing the
pork problem.
That brings us back to the allure of fast track mechanisms such as
expedited rescission, for the key point here is that a fast track regime
can act as a close functional substitute for the unconstitutional legislative veto by likewise giving Congress both flexibility and control.51
The following chart illustrates, by arranging various mechanisms
along a scale from most to least control over presidential authority.
THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION WILL FAIL IF ...

Majority of a
Committee Opposes

Majority of One
House Opposes

Majority of Both
Houses Oppose

2/3 of Both
Houses Oppose

Most Control Over

Least Control Over

President

President
Corresponding Device:

Committee

0

Legislative Veto
9

49
50

One-House

*

Two-House

*

Delegation to

Legislative

Legislative

Executive,

Veto

Veto

Reversible Via

Fast Track

New Statute-

(e.g., Exped-

Veto Override

ited Recission)

Required

Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1013, 88 Stat. 297, 334 (1974).
See City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 901-02 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (invalidating the deferral procedures and the associated legislative veto in the 1974 Act). Congress
amended the law to permit temporary unilateral deferrals for managerial reasons only (as
opposed to policy-based deferrals). See 2 U.S.C. § 684(b) (2000); see also Louis Fisher, The
Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 287 (1993) (describing the history of the deferral provision); MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., LINE ITEM VETO: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF RECENT PROPOSALS 8-10

51

(2006),

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33365.pdf (same).
The functional similarity between fast track regimes and the legislative veto was discussed
by then-Judge Breyer. See Stephen Breyer, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, Thomas F. Ryan Lecture at the
Georgetown University Law Center (Oct. 13, 1983), in 72 GEO. LJ. 785, 792-96 (1984);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-257, pt. 3, at 3 (1983) (suggesting that fast track schemes will become more popular in the wake of the Chadha decision); Tiefer, supra note 10, at 423
(noting that Chadha and the line item veto decisions increased the importance of the alternative strategy of passing laws that streamline the legislative process).
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The Supreme Court has removed several of the mechanisms by
declaring them unconstitutional. The various versions of the legislative veto are impermissible under Chadha.2 After Chadha, there remained the possibility (represented on the far right of the chart) of
delegating broad authority to the executive and then using the normal Article I, Section 7 process of passing a new statute to override
the President's action. This arrangement gives Congress relatively
less control than do other mechanisms, as the President would likely
veto the override statute . And of course, in the budget context, at
least some versions of this arrangement are constitutionally impermissible under Clinton v. City ofNew York, in which the Supreme Court
refused to characterize the "cancellation" authority as a form of runof-the-mill delegation, and instead construed it as violating Article I,

Section 7 .4
Here fast track can fill the void. Under a fast track regime, the
President's decision will be overturned if a majority of either house
opposes it, for a majority of both are needed to enact the approval
bill. This mirrors a one-house legislative veto (the middle-of-the-road
variety, in terms of degree of control over the executive), under
which the President's decision will also be overturned if a majority of
either house opposes it. Put differently, under both mechanisms the
President will prevail only if a majority of each house supports him.
While both mechanisms condition presidential success on the
same level of congressional support-a majority in both houses-the
two mechanisms differ in terms of the burden of legislative inaction.
With the one-house veto, the President's decision prevails as long as

52

53

54

Chadha itself concerned a one-house legislative veto, but the Court's broad language and
its summary dispositions of subsequent cases concerning other varieties of the legislative
veto make it clear that all forms are unconstitutional. See Process Gas Consumers Group
v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216, 1216 (1983) (summarily affirming
the invalidation of a two-house legislative veto).
I should emphasize that we are here discussing the degree of congressional control over
the President only in terms of what proportion of the legislature has to disagree with the
President in order to defeat his decision after the fact. In this basic sense the delegation
option gives Congress relatively little control. In any arrangement, Congress can of
course also exercise control ex ante, such as by exempting certain measures from the operation of the delegated power. For example, under the 1996 Act, Congress could protect its interests by limiting the President's ability to cancel tax breaks to those items designated as limited tax benefits by the Joint Committee on Taxation; the Committee could
decide that a particular bill contained no such items, and such determination would not
be subject to any judicial review. Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 2(a),
110 Stat. 1200, 1210-11 (1996); see also Garrett, supra note 23, at 88.
See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
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Congress does not act (i.e., refrains from passing a disapproval resolution); under fast track, the President's decision prevails only when
Congress does act (i.e., passes the approval statute). This difference
between acting and refraining from acting is ordinarily extremely
important, for there are countless ways in which a bill can fail to pass
even if a majority supports it: an unfavorable committee vote, opposition by a key legislative leader, the Senate filibuster, et cetera. This is
where the fast track procedures really come into play, for the key feature of an effective fast track regime is that it reduces the inertia that
stands in the path of passinga law, making for a much more purely majoritarian process. The special procedures are supposed to guarantee
that the measure comes up for a vote quickly and automatically, thus
overcoming the procedural roadblocks and vetogates that characterize the usual legislative process. In terms of the amount of congressional effort required, approving the confirmation statute when it
automatically comes up for a vote is not that much different from refraining from adopting a legislative veto resolution. In this way fast
track and the one-house legislative veto are meant to approach a
rough equivalence in terms of policy outcomes.

According to its supporters, expedited rescission has one other
important virtue, too. Though it is functionally similar to the legislative veto, there may be all the difference in the world as a matter of
constitutional law. We turn, then, to the legal analysis of expedited
rescission, considering first a relatively easy legal question and then
introducing a harder one.
C. Solving the Clinton v. City of New York Problem
Is expedited rescission constitutional? For what it is worth, Congress certainly thinks that expedited rescission solves the constitutional problem identified in Clinton v. City of New York. Indeed, as one
of the committee reports on the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of
2006 states, the proposal was "specifically designed' 5 to avoid that defect:
In the case of the Legislative Line Item Veto Act [of 2006] ...the President merely proposes that a particular provision be canceled-he does not
do so unilaterally. To invalidate budgetary resources under this act re-

55

H.R. REp. No. 109-505, pt. 1, at 32 (2006).
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quires an act of Congress and the assent of the President, the same as any
other law enacted pursuant to the Constitution of the United States.
•.. This is indistinguishable from any other exercise of legislative or
56
executive power.

Congress is correct in its assessment that the new line item veto
would not be susceptible to the constitutional holding of Clinton v.
City of New York. Unlike the 1996 Act, which (as the Supreme Court
conceptualized it) allowed the President to "cancel" provisions of law
unilaterally, here the President can in no way be said to amend any
duly enacted statute. Rather, he signs the statute and then merely
proposes to Congress that it pass new legislation rescinding certain
items of spending. Proposing legislation is of course something the
President is constitutionally entitled to do. 57 Both houses of Congress
then vote on the bill proposing rescissions (bicameralism), and the
President signs the bill (presentment), thus satisfying Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. The enacted rescission legislation is thus
formally unexceptionable. The original spending statute has simply
been amended by a second statute, just as Chadharequires. True, the
amendment was given preferential parliamentary treatment. But, as
noted earlier, the United States Code is filled with statutory frameworks
for considering various types of legislation, and no court has ever said
that the enactments that come out of those frameworks-which still
observe the dictates of Article I, Section 7-are defective. 5
Thus, at least as regards the Clinton v. City of New York problem, it
seems reasonably clear that expedited rescission is constitutional.5 9

56

Id. at 32-33.

57

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President may "recommend to [Congress's]
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient").
Other commentators agree that statutes passed pursuant to such a regime do not run
afoul of Chadha. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 51, at 792-96; Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 18-20 (1984).
To be sure, the expedited rescission approach does give the President the authority to
temporarily suspend items that are subject to his rescission requests, so that Congress has

58

59

time to consider whether to rescind. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-505, pt. 2, at 4, 18 (2006); S.
REP. No. 109-283, at 16-17 (2006). One might ask whether, if presidential "cancellation"
is forbidden under Clinton v. City of New York, a temporary suspension should in principle
fare any better. Even accepting Clinton as correct, I believe that a temporary freeze is distinguishable. Current law has for decades provided that same temporary power. See 2
U.S.C. §§ 683, 688 (2000) (outlining the procedure for the President's rescission of
budgetary authority and the procedure for the rescission within the House and the Senate, respectively); supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
I should note that some versions of expedited rescission could potentially permit the
temporary freezes to become de facto permanent rescissions, such as if the withholding
period lasted through the end of the fiscal year, or if the President repeatedly targeted
the same item again and again until the budget authority expired. See S. REP. No. 109-
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D. A Different ConstitutionalProblem?
Challengers might, however, attempt a different, and more promising, line of attack. Might there not be some problem, they would
say, with the fact that Congress was required-atthe President's insistence-to follow a quick, fixed timetable and vote on an unamendable package confected by the President himself? After all, Article I,
Section 7 envisions Congress as the body that packages legislation
and presents take-it-or-leave-it propositions to the President, and this
fast track regime reverses that. Does the President have any business
forcing Congress to hold votes on proposals of his choosing on a
schedule of his liking?
Those are all very good questions, and they require us to acknowledge the unmentioned elephant standing in the middle of the debate
over the recent expedited rescission bills. The bills are full of mandatory language: the majority leader of each house "shall" introduce
the President's approval bill within five days of the special message,
the relevant committees "shall" report it within seven days after that,
certain dilatory motions "shall not" be entertained, debate "shall not"
exceed a fixed number of hours, and amendments "shall [not] be in
order."60 Likewise, in the committee reports, one reads that the majority leader is "required" to introduce the President's bill, the committee is "require[d]" to report it, the Speaker "must" schedule debate, each house is "required" to take an up or down vote, and so
forth. Indeed, that is supposed to be the point of the new law. Under the old rescission process in the 1974 Act, "Congress can simply
ignore rescissions submitted by the President. The Legislative Line

283, at 15-17 (noting risks in the administration's proposed bill and explaining that the
bill had been amended to address concerns over the risks and to improve rescission procedures); Seema Mittal, Note, The Constitutionality of an Expedited Rescission Act: The New
Line Item Veto or a New ConstitutionalMethod of Achieving Deficit Reduction?, 76 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 125, 139-48 (2007) (discussing constitutional problems with suspension provisions);
RICHARD KOGAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
LEGISLATION WOULD INVITE ABUSE BY EXECUTWVE BRANCH:
WITHHOLDING

60
61

FUNDS

AFTER

CONGRESS

VOTED

TO

PROPOSED LINE-ITEM VETO
PRESIDENT COULD CONTINUE

RELEASE

THEM

6-8

(2006),

http://www.cbpp.org/3-23-06bud.pdf (discussing the potential for abuse in the administration's proposal). Given that skillful drafting could avert de facto unilateral rescissions,
I do not think that this is a decisive constitutional objection to expedited rescission more
generally.
H.R. 4890, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006).
See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. NO. 109-505, pt. 2, at 16-17, 23; H.R. REP. NO. 109-505, pt. 1, at 9, 15,
16, 23, 42 (2006); S. REP. No. 109-283, at 16, 30-31.
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Item Veto Act [of 2006] requires Congress to vote up or [down] on a
stand-alone bill containing the items the President seeks to cancel."62
Could that really be true? Is Congress required to follow the expedited procedures set forth in the statute? Could a statute so requiring be constitutional? We turn to those questions next.
III. THE LEGAL (NON)EFFECT OF EXPEDITED RESCISSION
This Part of the Article addresses several legal questions surrounding whether Congress is really required to follow the special statutory
rescission procedures. At the outset, I should acknowledge that one
easy answer is to respond that, even if Congress is acting illegally by
failing to honor the fast track procedures, no earthly power could
force it to act. That is, it appears that the controversy is nonjusticiable, either for want of standing or as a political question or both. Regarding standing, a challenge to Congress's failure to obey the procedures is quite different from a challenge to the statute that results
when Congress does follow the procedures and approves a rescission.
In the latter case, the beneficiaries of the cancelled program would
have Article III standing to sue under the reasoning of Clinton v. City
63
Parties suffering concrete and particularized injuries
of New York.
are harder to find in the situation where Congress simply fails to act,
and a spending item or tax break remains law. Further, the challenge
smacks of a political question inasmuch as a court would be asked to
intrude into Congress's manner of handling its calendar, and possibly
to require Congress to hold a vote it did not want to hold. Thus,
Congress would probably be immune from judicial correction if it
failed to follow the statutory fast track procedures. (Readers interested in the analysis that supports the conclusions just stated can find
it in Part VI of this Article, which considers justiciability in some detail.)
But justiciability is not the end of the matter. One can do wrong
even if there is no chance of being caught. A dismissal for want of
justiciability is not an endorsement of the defendant's position on the

62
63

H.R. REP. No. 109-505, pt. 1, at 13.
See Clinton v. City of NewYork, 524 U.S. 417, 429-36 (1998) (holding that the President's
cancellation of a limited tax benefit and a spending item caused an immediate injury in
fact). Beyond the Article III requirements, there is of course the problem of prudential
standing and the existence of a statutory right to sue. In the 1996 Act, Congress expressly
provided that "any individual" adversely affected by the Act could sue for declaratory and
injunctive relief. Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 3, 110 Stat. 1200,
1211 (1996).
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merits.64 Congress is oftentimes the only judge of whether its actions
are legal, and legislators do care to some degree whether their judicially
unreviewable acts are legal or not.65 And whether or not they care
about legality, some of us on the outside do. So, therefore, while acknowledging problems regarding justiciability, we can and should still
ask whether it is legal for Congress to ignore the statutory procedures
providing for expedited consideration of the President's rescission
bills.
This is simply one aspect of the more general question of whether
Congress is required to follow rules set down by statute. When a statute says that each house "shall" vote on the President's bill, "shall
not" amend it, et cetera, one would ordinarily think that a lawabiding Congress would need to amend that statute if it wished to do
otherwise. After all, Chadha tells us that "repeal of statutes, no less
than enactment," must conform with Article I's path of bicameralism
and presentment. 66 But could it really be true that a house of Congress could be required to follow statutory procedures it later does
not wish to follow?
Congress recognizes that there is a problem here. Amid all the
statements about what Congress "must" and is "required" to do, one
finds in one of the committee reports the rather dissonant statement
that "Congress is constitutionally empowered to deactivate any expedited consideration procedures if either [h]ouse chooses .... 67 Indeed, though it is certainly easy to miss, Congress has provided itself an
escape hatch in the line item veto legislation itself Section 3 of House Bill
4890, labeled "Technical and Conforming Amendments," would
amend an uncodified provision of the 1974 Act to include a new
cross-reference to the fast track procedures that House Bill 4890

64

Cf Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2573 (2007) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("Government officials must make a conscious decision to obey the Constitution whether or not their acts can be challenged in a court of law and then must conform their actions to these principled determinations."); Paul Brest, The ConscientiousLegislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,27 STAN. L. REv. 585, 589 (1975) ("Decisions
not striking down laws do not always mean that the laws are constitutional, however, for a
court's failure to invalidate may only reflect its institutional limitations.").

65

Most political scientists recognize that legislators' opinions of a bill's constitutionality
have some effect on their behavior, along with more tangible factors such as impact on
electoral prospects. Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 245-47 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005). See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS
(3d ed. 1989) (explaining that legislators pursue a mixed set of goals in their decision
making).

66

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).

67

H.R. REP. No. 109-505, pt. 1, at 22.
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would enact.8 When one turns to the relevant provision in the 1974
Act, one finds a statement that the Code sections setting out special
parliamentary procedures in the budget context
are enacted by the Congress(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such they shall be considered as part of the rules of each House, respectively, or of that House to
which they specifically apply, and such rules shall supersede other rules
only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to
change such rules (so far as relating to such House) at any time, in the
same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of
such House.69
Thus, despite all the language in the bill about what Congress "shall"
do, and the similarly mandatory tone sounded in the committee reports, in reality Congress is not so willing to bind itself. Variations on
this language are routinely inserted into the dozens of statutory provisions that regulate congressional rules of debate.
The above escape clause is puzzling in a few ways. As a legal matter, the reservation of the right to effectively repeal a statute by action
of one house would seem to conflict with Chadha's teaching that "repeal of statutes, no less than enactment," must conform with bicameralism and presentment. 70 As a practical matter, it appears to nullify
the binding commitment that is the new act's raison ditre. Why would
Congress pass a law that depends on tying its own hands and then untie them in the next breath?
Perhaps part of the answer is that Congress is not really serious
about the proposal. But, more charitably, it may also be true that
Congress sincerely believes that, try as it might, it just cannot, as a
matter of constitutional law, tie its hands with binding statutory procedures. In previous work, I have explained at some length why, as a
matter of constitutional law, Congress is correct that each house remains free to set its own rules regardless of any statute governing parliamentary procedures.7" The short of it is that the contrary result-
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H.R. 4890, 109th Cong. § 3(a) (2006). The Senate versions, Senate Bill 2381 and Senate
Bill 3521, contained equivalent provisions, and such clauses are typical of statutes that enact parliamentary rules.
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
§ 904(a), 88 Stat. 297, 331 (1974). This uncodified provision is set out in a note following
2 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954.
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If theJudicialConfirmation Process Is Broken, Can a StatuteFix It?, 85
NEB. L. REv. 960, 976-1010 (2007); Bruhl, supranote 10, at 372-413.
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that is, binding statutory rules-would impair each chamber's autonomy in a way that conflicts with the Constitution's decision to vest
each chamber with control over its order of business, a decision that
is manifested in a variety of ways but most notably through the Rules
of Proceedings Clause.72 The rules power is thus an important aspect
of our system of separation of powers, just like each house's power to
discipline its members, to judge their elections, and to have its mem-7
bers be free from prosecution based on internal communications.
These considerations all work towards making Congress, in the plan
of the Constitution, the most autonomous branch.
In sum, then, each house of Congress is constitutionally empowered to abrogate any statutory procedures that purport to bind it. As
further security, Congress has provided itself with a statutory "out"
that permits it to change the statutory rules. But the escape hatch inserted in statutized rules merely restates what is the case as a matter
of constitutional law.
Yet we are still left with the puzzle of why Congress would pass a
law, the supposed rationale for which is that it ties Congress's hands,
when Congress's hands are not really tied and constitutionally cannot
be. This is what the next Part of this Article seeks to explain.
IV. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF EXPEDITED RESCISSION: WHY WOULD
CONGRESS PASS THE STATUTE AND How WOULD IT WORK (OR NOT)?

Congress has passed dozens of statutized rules and framework
laws, notwithstanding that legally they do not bind. Why would it do
such a thing? This Part of the Article seeks to move beyond the
purely legal questions surrounding expedited rescission and to derive
some more practically oriented conclusions about the proposal's
likely effects and true purposes.
There are at least two different questions regarding why Congress
would enact an expedited rescission framework. First, why employ
the vehicle of a statute instead of an internal parliamentary rule?
Second, why deviate from the usual legislative process by creating a
special framework regime (using either vehicle) at all? To give structure and context to our answers, it is useful to turn to the recent work
72

U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.... ").
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See id. cl. I ("Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications
of its own Members.... "); id. cl. 2 ("Each House ma..... punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour. . . ."); id. § 6, cl. 1 ("[A]nd for any Speech or Debate in either House,

they shall not be questioned in any other Place.").
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of Elizabeth Garrett, which seeks to provide an account of the purposes of, and conditions for, the enactment of statutized procedural
frameworks. As to the first question-the choice between statute and
rule-Garrett proposes three potential answers, namely that (1) a
statute may do more to signal an important and durable change, (2)
a statute may be necessary because the internal procedural changes
are part of an integrated bargain that includes items that have legislative effect and thus must be accomplished by statute, and (3) the use
of a statute may reflect path dependence and institutional learning
(i.e., a statutized rule has been used before in a related context, giving legislators familiarity with it and making it a ready candidate to be
used again) 7 Garrett believes the second factor is usually the most
important, and it seems a likely explanation here as well: although
most of the expedited rescission framework involves internal rules
that could be adopted through a simple or concurrent resolution,7 '
some aspects of the bill have effect outside of the two chambers and
require genuine legislation, notably the provisions allowing the President to suspend certain tax and spending items while a rescission request is pending. 76 Garrett's third factor likely also plays a role, for
fast track regimes are familiar, tested tools, and other types of statutized frameworks have been used in the budget process before. The
first factor, as Garrett recognizes, is somewhat questionable given that
statutized rules are, as a formal matter, no more binding than internal rules. But it is possible that using the statutory form is meant to
send some sort of message that Congress is serious about the reform.
I believe we can reach some more interesting and novel conclusions, however, on the question of why a framework would be enacted
at all, apart from whether it is in the form of a statute or a rule. Here
again Garrett provides a useful typology. Among the purposes that
frameworks can serve, she identifies (1) symbolism, (2) the establishment of neutral rules, (3) coordination, (4) pre-commitment to
(and entrenchment of) certain substantive outcomes, and (5)
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See Elizabeth Garrett, Conditionsfor Framework Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH:
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 294, 307-18 (Richard W.
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Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
A simple resolution is a resolution passed by only one house; a concurrent resolution is
passed by both houses but is not presented to the President. Neither has external legislative effect but instead typically involves internal affairs. Ajoint resolution, in contrast, is
passed by both houses and presented to the President and is functionally equivalent to an
enacted bill.
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See supranote 59.
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changes to the intra-/inter-branch balance of power." Which of
these explains expedited rescission? If one follows the "official" explanation for expedited rescission presented in Part II above, its purpose would appear to be mostly a combination of (4) and (5): Congress is trying to commit to budgetary restraint and, as part of the
method of doing so, shifts more budget-cutting power to the President. But whatever the precise account, the "official" story takes a
major hit once one recognizes that, as we have seen above, the
framework is not legally binding at all. Perhaps, then, the real purpose is just option (1), i.e., symbolism?
That could end up being correct, but in order to decide with any
confidence what this statute's true point is, one needs first to figure
out how it would work in practice. As we will see, the statutory
framework may be quite effective in practice, under certain institutional circumstances, even though it lacks legally binding force.
Congress has passed dozens of these statutes, after all, so perhaps
there is more going on here than just symbolism.
Once we determine how this framework would actually be expected to work, I suspect we will find that its main purpose is not the
official good-government one, but neither is it just symbolism.
Rather, there is good reason to think that the statute has a distinctly
partisan aspect: it will help the ruling party and harm the minority
party.
A. How Statutized Rules Can Attract Compliance
Given that we are trying to predict congressional behavior, the following analysis is necessarily somewhat tentative. We had only very
limited experience under the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 before it
was declared unconstitutional. Although there is a more substantial
body of data from the many states with some form of a line item
veto, 8 differences between the federal and state legislative processes
mean that we cannot assume the effects will be the same. Further, a
77
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SeeGarrett, supra note 10, at733-64.
See, e.g., Glenn Abney & Thomas P. Lauth, The Line-Item Veto in the States: An Instrument for
Fiscal Restraint or an Instrumentfor Partisanship?,45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 372 (1985) (examining the ends for which state governors use the line item veto); James Aim & Mark Evers,
The Item Veto and State Government Expenditures, 68 PUB. CHOICE 1 (1991) (suggesting that
the line item veto only minimally reduces state spending); Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Line
Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets: Evidence from the States, 36J. PUB. ECON. 269 (1988) (examining the claim that gubernatorial line item veto power reduces state spending); Catherine C. Reese, The Line-Item Veto in Practice in Ten Southern States, 57 PUB. ADMIN. RE\'. 510
(1997) (attempting to account for nonuse and low fiscal impact of the line item veto).
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basic limitation of all the prior data is that here we are not dealing
with a real line item veto. Under expedited rescission, the executive
cannot undo law unilaterally; rather, Congress must still pass the proposed rescissions, which adds an additional layer of decisions and decision makers whose actions we must predict.
Another potential source of guidance comes from the dozens of
other fast track procedures and statutized rules tucked away in the
United States Code. Again, though, their relevance is limited by the fact
that different policy areas and their associated frameworks each tend
to have their own special characteristics; Congress's behavior under a
framework for Amtrak reorganization bills does not necessarily bear
much relationship to its behavior under the Electoral Count Act.
Looking to the evidence in the aggregate, Congress's record of compliance with statutory regimes presents a distinctly mixed bag. On
the one hand, Congress has on numerous occasions decided not to
follow statutized rules, and it has done so in at least two different
ways. First, as the statutes themselves usually state, the statutized rule
can be changed "in the same manner, and to the same extent as in
the case of any other rule of such House."7 9 Thus, like the standing
rules themselves, the statutory procedures are in no way immutable,
and the statute itself provides an authorized way to evade the expedited procedures. In the House of Representatives, the typical
method for regulating the procedural details of debate on a bill is a
special rule reported by the Rules Committee,"' and such a special
rule could be used here to trump the statutory provisions. Thus, in
the 1980s, a Democratic House at one point decided not to follow
special preferential statutory procedures regarding one of President
Reagan's requests for aid to the Nicaraguan Contra rebels, following
instead the special rule reported by the Rules Committee."' Second,
leaders in key gatekeeping or scheduling positions could simply decide to flout the rules, perhaps on the principled basis of the longstanding congressional view that each house can circumvent statutory

79

See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
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See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 125-26
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(7th ed. 2007).
For descriptions of this incident, see Jeffrey A. Meyer, CongressionalControl of ForeignAssistance, 13 YALEJ. INT'L L. 69, 99 n. 141 (1988), and Edmund W. Sim, Derailingthe Fast-Track
for International Trade Agreements, 5 FLA. INT'L L.J. 471, 507-10 (1990). In the Senate,
unanimous consent agreements play a similar role in setting the terms of debate on particular bills. See OLESZEK, supra note 80.
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procedures, or perhaps on the basis of a simple prudential calculation that the will of the house is with them. 2
Nonetheless, it would be a serious mistake to think that statutized
rules are mere dead letters. One of the most important regimes of
statutized rules, the fast track system for trade agreements, in fact has
a strong record of compliance.83 In the most recent big test of fast
track, the vote on the Central American Free Trade Agreement, the
Senate did not filibuster the implementing bill, even though the
margin was razor thin and some senators fiercely opposed passage.4
Similarly, the bar on filibustering budget reconciliation bills has facilitated the passage of highly controversial measures, such as President Bush's 2001 tax cut and President Clinton's 1993 economic program, the latter of which passed by virtue of the Vice President's tiebreaking vote.5 While there is no way to know for sure that statutized
rules made the difference in these cases, both pieces of legislation
certainly look like the types of high-stakes, contentious measures that,
in the modern Congress, can usually succeed only with supermajority
support.
As with any question of compliance with a rule, one way to understand the compliance decision is by thinking in terms of how the
statutized rule aligns with (or fails to align with) Congress's preexisting preferences apart from the rule. In cases where using the statutory procedures benefits those in Congress in a position to ensure the
procedures are used (e.g., key majority leaders and committee chairs,
and the majority party more broadly), the procedures will of course
tend to be used, other things being equal. In such cases the statutized rule does little independent work (though perhaps it would
provide legitimacy to preexisting desires to suppress minority obstruction), since it matches what Congress would like to do anyway.
The more interesting case, of course, is when the statutized procedures conflict with what Congress (as its will is aggregated and expressed) would otherwise prefer to do if it were writing on a blank
slate. The statutized rules have some force as a focal point; they have
some claim to legitimacy inasmuch as they represent the prearranged
82
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See generally Bruhl, supra note 10, at 366-70.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 107-139, at 54 (2002) (noting that "neither House has ever acted unilaterally to withdraw application of fast track procedures").
Edmund Andrews, Senate Approves Free Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES,July 1, 2005, at Al.
See Tiefer, supra note 10, at 427, 433-41 (recounting the 2001 budget reconciliation
fight); David E. Rosenbaum, Clinton Wins Approval of His Budget Plan as Gore Votes To Break
Senate Deadlock, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1993, at I (reporting President Clinton's victory in the
1993 budget fight).
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method of handling contentious legislation. Further, if some legislators attempt to defect from the statutory settlement, those who support the procedures can be counted on to harangue their opponents
for breaking prior commitments and changing the rules of the
game-charges that might resonate with the public. That is, those
with an interest in following the special rules can use the statute to
batter opponents, portraying themselves as occupying the moral high
ground.
The statutized rule can work in another way as well. Not only can
some legislators use it as a sword against others, but it can also act as a
shield to be used against constituents. Consider, for instance, a Rust
Belt Democrat who is a free-trader at heart, but dare not admit that
to her constituents. When interested constituents demand that she
filibuster or amend a proposed trade pact, the legislator responds
that, while she deeply wants to do so, the fast track statute unfortunately has tied her hands. Similarly, in the expedited rescission context, a legislator could cite the statutory procedures in order to produce some slack to allow him to take a position his supporters
87
oppose.
The basic point is that the existence of the statutized rule is one
factor among many that will play into the calculus of decision; in
some cases it will not change behavior, but in other cases it will. The
following Section will turn to expedited rescission in particular and
assess how the dynamics can be expected to play out in practice.
B. A Tentative Account ofHow Expedited Rescission Could Serve Partisan
Aims
If Congress were actually to enact the expedited rescission proposal, it would provide lawyers and political scientists with a wonderful experiment in compliance with statutized rules, for the President's rescission proposals would generate frequent test cases. Until
that happens, we can approach the problem of predicting compliance through some educated guesswork based on theoretical and
empirical studies of the legislative process and distributive politics.
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See Bruhl, supra note 71, at 1011-13 (discussing factors that promote practical compliance
with inconvenient procedural rules).
Highly sophisticated observers might realize that the statute is nonbinding and thus see
through the legislator's rationalizations, but other constituents would be less informed
regarding the procedural and constitutional details. Cf infra note 98 (comparing the
knowledge of with interest groups that of the public at large).
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The reader will recall that the standard theory of how the expedited rescission statute works is that it would simply allow the President to single out undesirable special interest pork, while leaving
substantive policymaking unaffected. That vision is almost certainly
incomplete because, among other things, it neglects the fact that the
existence of a presidential rescission authority would affect the dynamics of the legislative process and alter the legislation that is sent
to the President in the first place. 8 Thus, while one might initially
think that the only effect would be on the parts of bills subject to rescission, that view would be mistaken or at least oversimplified. The
narrow spending projects that find their way into so many bills cannot
uniformly be regarded as mere add-ons to bills that would have

passed in any event.89 It is extremely difficult to pass substantive legislation. Not only must the same text be approved by both houses of
Congress and the President, which means multiple majorities or even
supermajorities, but there are numerous stops along the waycommittees with jurisdiction over the subject matter, the House Rules
Committee, et cetera-where a bill can stall in countless ways. Each
of these procedural hurdles, or vetogates, is controlled by one or
more gatekeepers with the power to kill a bill. 90 All of these people
ordinarily must support (or at least not actively oppose) the bill.
Some bills can succeed only by adding "wasteful" projects targeted
toward interests or localities dear to needed legislators. In other
words, pork can grease the hinges of vetogates.
Given the deal-making power of pork, a tool that lets the President slice out pork could easily have the effect of thwarting the
agreements that led to passage of a particular bill in the first place.
Why would a pivotal legislator be persuaded to support a bill he otherwise does not like, if he knows that the sponsor's enticing promises
88
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For attempts to discern how a true line item veto would impact legislative bargaining, see,
for example, Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REV.
403, 412-19 (1988), RobertJ. Spitzer, The Item Veto Reconsidered, 15 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
611 (1985), and Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 385, 412-22 (1992). For a discussion of the broader topic of how legislators
use particularized benefits to form the coalitions needed to pass general interest legislation, see DIANA EVANS, GREASING THE WHEELS: USING PORK BARREL PROJECTS To BUILD
MAJORITY COALITIONS IN CONGRESS (2004).
To be sure, a few bills are "must pass" legislation. These are especially prone to attracting
wasteful riders. But the pork phenomenon is in no way limited to that type of bill.
For expositions of the vetogate/proceduralist approach to the legislative process, see
generally, for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRcEY & ELIZABETH
GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 68-81 (2000), and McNollgast,
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994).
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of a new federal building in his district are subject to abrogation
through a later rescission? Quite possibly he would not. The risk of
subsequent rescission means that legislators would want, to the extent
feasible, assurances that their projects are safe before agreeing to support a bill. Those assurances could come from at least two places:
from the President (who can pledge not to propose rescission in the
first place) and from fellow legislators (who are in a position to control use of the procedures if rescission is proposed). We should
therefore examine how these actors would go about making their decisions.
Looking first at the political dynamics surrounding the President's
decision making, we see that members of his own party have the advantage for multiple reasons. For one, because their policy preferences are generally closer to his than are the policy preferences of
the other party, members of the President's party will have an easier
time pledging to support his favored bills as the price of protecting
their projects. 9' Further, when the number of legislators seeking to
hitch themselves and their projects to the President's bill comfortably
exceeds the number needed to win passage, he can choose whom to
protect. There are a variety of considerations that could influence
the President's decision, some of which are independent of party
membership. Indeed, Presidents need the support of members of
the opposing party for various reasons, most obviously when the opposing party is the majority party in one or both houses of Congress.2
And a President might be motivated to benefit an anticipated swing
state in an upcoming presidential election regardless of the party of
its representatives. Nonetheless, in general, a President will be more
inclined to rescind items that belong to members of the opposing
party. (One reason is that pork can help members curry favor with
constituents and contributors and thus aids their reelection. )
93
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It is worth noting in this regard, if only for comic relief, that House Bill 4890 § 4 contains
a "sense of Congress" statement that the President should not use his rescission authority
abusively as a bargaining chip. That statement was inserted as a substitute for a somewhat
more serious-sounding amendment that would have purported to prohibit the President
from using rescission threats in negotiations. See H.R. REP. No. 109-505, pt. 1, at 20
(2006).
See, e.g., John M. Broder, Clinton Gently Vetoes $144 Million in Military Budget Items, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1997, at A12 (noting that President Clinton did not cancel large appro-
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priations benefiting Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and House Speaker Newt Gingrich).
While this proposition may seem intuitively obvious, proving the case is actually a bit
more difficult than one might expect. Incumbents in extremely safe districts may have
little need to distribute pork, and it may be that most voters in a district are uninformed
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Therefore, we could expect that the type of congressperson most
likely to be targeted by the President, other things being equal, is (1)
a member of the opposing party (2) when the opposing party is in
the minority in both houses.
Let us next consider the dynamics on the legislative side. In those
cases in which the President proposes rescissions, what is Congress
likely to do? Broadly speaking, there are three options: (1) follow
the fast track procedures and enact the rescission proposal, (2) follow
the fast track procedures and reject the rescission proposal, and (3)
not follow the procedures and thus avoid an up-or-down vote, silently
letting the targeted spending items remain law.
In considering which option Congress will choose, it should not
be controversial to start with the proposition that there will be a relationship between members' preferences on the merits of a particular
rescission proposal and their willingness to follow the fast track procedures. If the legislature supports the rescission proposal on the merits, then that increases the chances that it will follow the fast track
procedures in order to ease passage (such as by preventing a Senate
filibuster or circumventing a troublesome committee chairman). In
such a case, the procedures and self-interest reinforce each other.
If, in contrast, a house were inclined to oppose the President's rescission on the merits, it faces a choice between options (2) and (3).
Let us explore these two options a bit more.
Under what circumstances would legislators choose option (2)that is, follow the procedures only to vote againstrescission? The official theory of expedited rescission suggests that this should be rare:
the crawfish research station can pass when hidden away in a massive
highway bill, but not when the pork (or crawfish, as the case may be)
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and unaffected anyway. Still, district-based benefits could matter to some attentive voters,
and organized interests outside the district certainly might make campaign contributions
based on particularized benefits directed their way-and this matters at least for some
legislators. See Robert M. Stein & Kenneth N. Bickers, CongressionalElections and the Pork
Barrel, 56J. POL. 377, 382-84 (1994). Further, legislators may believe that distributing
pork helps even if that belief in fact overstates the reality. See MAYHEW, supra note 44, at
57.
One might wonder how a member of the minority would get pet projects into a bill to
begin with. There are a number of answers, which include the following: (1) the ordinary (non-fast track) legislative process is supermajoritarian, especially in the Senate, so
that support from the minority is useful or even required, even in partisan votes, (2) not
all legislation will attract the support of enough of the majority party to succeed, so some
members of the minority are needed for passage, and (3) there may exist norms or incentives that encourage all members to support other members' projects with little regard to
party. For citations supporting (3), see MAYHEW, supra note 44, at 88-91, 97.
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is put in the spotlight. 95 If that theory is right, then the President's rescission proposals would be hard to turn down, either because the
legislators genuinely wish, on policy grounds, that the bill they passed
was not larded with pork, or because, politically, they need to appear
budget conscious in the spotlighted re-vote (whether for individualized reasons, or in order to preserve their party's reputation as responsible) .96 But there is reason to doubt the hypothesis that legislators would always be so eager to embrace rescissions. It is certainly
not obvious that electoral incentives would lead legislators to vote for
restraint. The loss of geographically concentrated benefits deprives
legislators of valuable credit-claiming opportunities with their constituents; after all, the voters (or, at least, many of them) might appreciate public works projects in their district. In that case, legislators
might indeed hold an up-or-down re-vote, but only to vote for their
projects once more and showcase their position in favor of their constituents' goodies.97 It is plausible, then, that there is some nonnegligible subset of cases in which the procedures are followed, even
though the rescissions are rejected on the merits.
There will also be a subset, however, in which legislators likewise
disfavor the rescission on the merits but decide to defeat the rescission through option (3)-that is, by ignoring the fast track rules.
This scenario is especially likely in the case of projects or loopholes
meant to enrich special interests that provide campaign donations.
Because of these groups' financial support, legislators have a reason
to support the groups' items, even when the voters of the district are
somewhat opposed (or would become opposed when a future electoral challenger highlighted the vote). Ordinary voters are relatively
less able to understand the mysterious procedural machinations that
95
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See supraPart II.B.
Members of a party have an interest in the party having a good reputation. But the reputation is a collective good that each member will have an incentive to underproduce in
favor of advancing individual aims. Safeguarding the party reputation by limiting the behavior of legislators is one good produced by party leaders. See GARY W. COX & MATHEW
D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 123, 190
(1993) (comparing individual reputations to private goods and party reputations to public goods); see also Gregory L. Hager & Jeffery C. Talbert, Look for the Party Label: Party Influences on Voting in the U.S. House, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 75, 76-77 (2000) (comparing party
reputation to a "brand name").
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See Edmund L. Andrews & Robert Pear, With New Rules, Congress Boasts of Pet Projects, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, at Al ("Far from causing embarrassment, the new transparency
[mandated by earmark reform] has raised the value of earmarks .... [L]awmakers have
often competed to have their names attached to individual earmarks and rushed to put
out press releases claiming credit for the money they bring home."). On the electoral
value of credit claiming and position taking, see MAYHEW, supra note 44, at 52-73.
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can kill a bill through inaction as compared to the relative ease of
understanding an explicit vote in favor of pork. Thus, the most attractive alternative in this kind of case would be to kill the bill silently
by ignoring the fast track voting requirement: the contributors get
what they want, but legislators do not have to take a public stand in
support of the projects. In other words, legislators would evade the
forced public scrutiny upon which the theory of expedited rescission
relies.
In sum, there are certainly scenarios under which the President's
rescissions will fail, either through an actual vote or through inaction.
The odds of failure would seem larger when the President's rescission
bill includes many items dear to lots of legislators. But it is at this
point that we need to pay attention to how the President is permitted
to package his rescission proposals. Under the version of expedited
rescission that passed the House in 2006, he could submit five or, in
the case of the larger bills, ten separate rescission proposals for each
bill Congress passes. 99 He might therefore improve his odds of success by putting together bills with shorter lists of wasteful items. l00
The crawfish research station and the bridge to nowhere could be
made to stand (or fall) mostly on their own.
But, still, which would it be, stand or fall? Even disaggregation
does not guarantee an attractive rescission bill that Congress would
want to enact. Just as a single bill containing all of the proposed rescissions could face stiff opposition, legislators might be able to
credibly agree among themselves to support each other's special projects when they are separately targeted. And even if legislators did
not band together in that way, individual members could seek protection from key leadership figures who are in a position to derail the
expedited procedures. Although there is no sure way to predict
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The assumption that organized special interests have a relative advantage over the public
at large when it comes to understanding and reacting to less salient, behind-the-scenes
procedural matters should not be controversial. See MAYHEW, supra note 44, at 115-16
(discussing interest group monitoring and mobilization); Tim Westmoreland, Standard
Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking,95 GEO. LJ. 1555, 1600 (2007) (discussing the
effect of complicated budget process rules on accountability). See generally R. DOUGLAS
ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 64-68 (1990) (discussing how Congress
distinguishes between "attentive" and "inattentive" publics).
H.R. 4890, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (proposed amendment to § 1011(b) (1) (D) of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974).
In the short experience with the line item veto under the Clinton Administration, the
record shows that, after a large rescission featuring many items was overturned by Congress, the President switched to using more modest proposals featuring fewer items. See
Garrett, supra note 32, at 919-20; Broder, supra note 92, at A12.
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whether, how often, and how durably such deals might emerge, basic
common sense does tell us that there are certain factors that likely
help, and others that likely hinder, their formation. One obvious hypothesis is that, while there is some universalistic regard for protecting all incumbents, members of the same party are generally more
likely to protect each other's projects than they are to go out on a
limb for members of the other party.'(' Therefore, rescission bills
that target members of the minority party are, other things being
equal, more attractive to the chamber than are bills targeting the majority party. Since a rescission proposal is not enacted unless both
houses pass it, rescissions should be more likely to be enacted when
the same party is in the minority in both houses.
Combining together our predictions about presidential and congressional behavior, we see that the most reliably attractive kind of rescission bill-and thus the kind that we can be most confident will
trigger compliance with the fast track rules-is one that targets a
congressional minority not of the President's party. Under the 2006
configuration in Washington, when expedited rescission passed the
House and a Senate committee, that meant bills targeting Democrats.
Viewed in that light, it is little wonder that the Republican majority in
Congress was so supportive of a measure that at first glance appeared
to erode its legislative prerogatives. 10 2 And is it any wonder that the
2006 bills contained a sunset provision under which the line item
veto authority would expire several years down the road, to limit the
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Recent rules requiring disclosure of earmarks have provided useful data on the partisan
dimension of distributive politics. The data show that members of the majority party receive substantially more earmarks than members of the minority party. Erik Engstrom &
Georg Vanberg, The Politics of Congressional Earmarking (Dec. 24, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract1081654.
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The measure was supported 212-15 by Republicans and opposed 35-156 by Democrats.
See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 317, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2006/roll317.xml
(last visitedJan. 16, 2008). Vote tallies can of course be misleading indicators of legislator
preferences for numerous reasons. Pressure from party leaders can produce greater partisan polarization; at the same time, if passage or failure is already ordained, a legislator
can vote solely for position-taking purposes.
It is worth noting that the Congress that passed the 1996 Act was controlled by Republicans, and the strongest opposition came from Democrats, even though Democrat
Bill Clinton was President. This does not, necessarily, mean that Republicans were acting
against their partisan interests in passing the law. Enacting a line item veto had been a
campaign pledge, part of the Republicans' 1994 "Contract with America." Republican
presidential candidate and Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole made passing the law a key
campaign issue. The law also included a delayed effective date, meaning that it would not
become effective until after the presidential election, holding out the possibility that Dole
would be the first President to wield the power. See Garrett, supra note 23, at 58, 77-79,
81-83.
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damage should Republicans in a few years have found themselves in
the minority under a Democratic President?""3
C. Implications of the Analysis
Having explored how expedited rescission might actually function, we can now decide what our analysis tells us about the likely
purposes of the expedited rescission proposal. And we are also now
in a position to discern how this proposal would differ in effect from
a more conventional line item veto.
1. The Purpose of Expedited Rescission
If one credits the "official" explanation for expedited rescission,
its purpose would be cutting pork by entrenching anti-pork procedures and/or by shifting budget-cutting power to the President. The
analysis above suggests that expedited rescission might do relatively
little to reduce special interest projects. So the official line regarding
the purpose of the new line item veto is at best incomplete. Yet that
does not mean that we must embrace the alternative hypothesis that
the statute is just symbolic and without actual effect. Rather, the
analysis points toward the mechanism's ability to benefit the President and the legislative majority (especially the leaders who can control use of the procedures). The effect is most powerful when there
is unified government.
To be sure, one should not overstate the case and portray the dynamics surrounding expedited rescission exclusively in terms of partisan opportunism. I would not contend, for example, that the desire
to harm the minority is the only reason that legislators would favor
the proposal; certainly that desire is not itself sufficient to explain observed events. Otherwise we would see line item vetoes enacted
whenever there is unified government, which we have not. Whatever
their place in the institutional configuration-ruling party, minority
party, participant in divided government-Republicans tend to favor
the line item veto in its various forms more than do Democrats. This
might be because Republicans' official party ideology and platform
favors lower spending (whether recent conduct matches that position
is left as an exercise for the reader) or because, having spent so much
103

House Bill 4890 specified expiration in 2012. H.R. 4890, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006). Senate
Bill 3521 specified expiration in 2010. S. 3521, 109th Cong. (2006). On reasons for and
dynamics of sunset provisions, see generally Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U.
CHI. L. REv. 247, 261-86 (2007).
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of the post-1930 era in the congressional minority, they are less institutionalist and less protective of legislative power. Media attention
given to scandalous earmarks also helps to explain the recent burst of
interest. In sum, multiple factors are at play.1 04 The partisan angle is
worth emphasizing, however, because it contrasts with the "good government" and budget-cutting rationales offered in support of the
proposal.
We can situate our findings within a larger ongoing debate about
the causes of congressional procedural change. Different observers
have put forward various theories for explaining the occurrence of
procedural changes that enhance or diminish minority rights, ranging from workload pressures to legislators' socialization regarding the
importance of minority rights. 0 5 One popular theory, advocated by
Sarah Binder and Douglas Dion (among others), is that procedural
change is driven by calculations of partisan advantage; rules, just like
ordinary legislation, are made to advance and facilitate substantive
goals. °6 Although it is difficult to draw any conclusions from a single
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Cf ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS 12-26 (2001) (explaining legislative organization
and institutional change as reflecting the influence of multiple intersecting interests).
See DOUGLAS DION, TURNING THE LEGISLATIVE THUMBSCREW: MINORITY RIGHTS AND
PROCEDURAL CHANGE IN LEGISLATIVE POLITICS 14-18 (1997) (summarizing various theories of congressional procedural change).
See generally SARAH A. BINDER, MINORTY RIGHTS, MAJORTY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESS (1997); DION, supra note 105. Although both writers focus
on partisanship, they have somewhat different views of when restrictions on minority
rights are most likely. To simplify, Dion's position is that small majorities, which are
more cohesive and face more powerful minorities, are more tempted to restrict minority
rights. See id. at 17, 36-37. But Binder emphasizes the importance of the majority's ability to restrict minority rights, which may increase as the majority becomes somewhat larger. See BINDER, supra, at 11-12. The Senate's failure to pass the expedited rescission bill
in 2006 might support Binder's position, if the reason was that the Democratic minority
in the Senate was strong enough to defeat the bill. See Keith Koffler, White House Vows To
Keep Pushingfor Line-Item Veto Bill, CONGRESS DAILY, July 21, 2006, http:// nationaljournal.com/cgi-bin/ifetch4?ENG+CONGRESS+7-cdindex+REVERSE+0+0+51830+F+5+23+1
+koffler+line+item (noting that most Democrats were opposed and that the sixty votes
needed to close debate might not have been available). But it is also possible that the
real reason the bill failed was that Republicans could not agree among themselves on how
to proceed. See id. (noting the different approaches taken by the White House and some
Senate Republicans and citing opposition from Republicans on the Appropriations and
Finance Committees). The bill reported to the Senate floor and championed by Budget
Committee Chairman Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) combined expedited rescission with a host of
other budget-cutting proposals not included in the White House proposal or the House
bill. SeeJudd Gregg, Stop Federal Overspending: Plan Controls Spigot and Offers Line-Item Authority, WASH. TIMES, June 21, 2006, at A21, available at http://budget.senate.gov/
republican/pressarchive/2006/2006-06-2l1ashTimesop-ed.pdf.
It could even be the
case that some ostensible supporters of the bill worked from the inside to undermine it.
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data point, especially when a proposal was not adopted, the analysis
of expedited rescission tends to support, or is at least consistent with,
the partisan theory in that it seems calculated to confer various advantages on the majority party in unified government. Further, both
Binder and Dion find little support for a variant of partisan theory
that emphasizes reciprocity, the idea that majorities will refrain from
repressing minorities when the odds of an impending reversal of minority and majority positions are higher. 11 7 The reciprocity account
fares poorly here, too: the 2006 proposal's failure likely cannot be
traced to Republicans' fears that the legislation would come back to
haunt them if they suffered electoral reversals, for the sunset provision would limit any such damage.
2. How Would Expedited Rescission Differfrom a Line Item Veto?
Armed with our tentative conclusions about how expedited rescission would work, what can we say about how it would differ from a
more conventional line item veto? One major difference, of course,
is that expedited rescission is constitutional under Clinton v. City of
New York, 1°s but we are here more concerned with differences in how
the two mechanisms would function in practice.
In some ways, commonalities predominate. Neither device seems
very likely to make much of a difference to the budget: pork is not
the main driver of budget problems and, even as regards pork, the
main effect may be to shift it around' l° Although the line item veto
appears to give even more power to the President than does expedited rescission, that effect should not be overstated. Under both devices, Congress has the ability to exempt any particular item from being cut before the spending bill even reaches the President; it need
only insert a clause to the effect that no items in the bill (or, only selected items) are subject to presidential targeting. " °
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See BINDER, supra note 106, at 9-10, 203-05; DION, supra note 105, at 17, 248-50.
524 U.S. 417 (1998); see supra Part II.C.
See, e.g., Spitzer, supra note 88, at 614-15 ("There is no reason to believe that an item veto
would stem the pork tide; rather, it would simply bias the legislative process more heavily
in favor of the president's pork, and that of his congressional colleagues."); Stearns, supra
note 88, at 417 (arguing that the line item veto might not decrease pork barrel legislation); Louis FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ITEM VETO: BUDGETARY SAVINGS 3 (2005),

http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22155_20050526.pdf ("Aside from modest savings, the
impact of an item veto may well be felt in preferring the President's spending priorities

over those enacted by Congress.").
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See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 482 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (making this point with regard to the
1996 Act).

Indeed, the 1996 Act contained a provision stating that no limited tax break
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The plainest difference is that expedited rescission makes the legislature the final decision maker after the President acts, because the
legislature must endorse the President's cuts. (With a line item veto
like the 1996 Act, in contrast, the President will more frequently have
the final word because reenacting the cancelled provisions would
typically require a two-thirds veto override.) In circumstances of divided government, this could give the congressional majority some
added comfort that the projects it puts in bills would survive (when
they were not exempted ex ante). Thus, other things being equal, expedited rescission is a less powerful presidential tool than a line item
veto in such circumstances.
A more interesting difference emerges when there is unified government. When there is unified government, the discussion above
indicates that the most likely targets for rescissions will be items that
belong to members of the minority party. That is probably also true
of a line item veto. So what difference does it make whether the
President unilaterally cuts those items (as with a line item veto), or
the legislature accepts his invitation to cut them (as with expedited
rescission)? Perhaps the main difference is in the relative opportunities for legislative position taking. When the President proposes a rescission, it gives legislators an opportunity to take a high profile, campaign-flyer-ready, public stand against waste by axing the useless
bridge or some other notorious boondoggle from the latest appropriations bill. That the projects the President happens to target likely
belong mostly to the minority makes it painless to boot. There is very

little risk of negative publicity because, if the President should happen to target a project the majority wants to preserve, Congress can
simply fail to vote, secure in the knowledge that the public will not
grasp the finer points of parliamentary procedure. In short, expedited rescission offers greater opportunity to manipulate voting opportunities for purposes of political showmanship. This is ironic,
given that expedited rescission is advertised as replacing legislative
subterfuge and manipulation with straightforward public accountability.

could be eliminated by the President, unless the Joint Committee on Taxation specified
in the bill at issue that certain tax breaks were susceptible to being cut. See supra note 53.
Some versions of the recent expedited rescission proposals contained somewhat similar
provisions. See H.R. 4890, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (proposed -amendment to § 1014 of
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974).
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CONCLUSION

The current "line item veto" proposal is on its surface paradoxical.
If its supporters are to be believed, the problem with Congress is that
its usual processes cannot be trusted to yield responsible budgetary
decision making. Thus, it is necessary to alter the structure of the
budgeting process to require legislators to consider the President's rescission proposals under special rules favorable to the President and
conducive to responsibility. Yet despite all of the mandatory language in the bills themselves and in the committee reports, the fact is
that the statute itself gives Congress the keys to unlock its selfimposed handcuffs through an explicit escape clause. And apart
from the statutory out, Congress's past practice and sound constitutional principles both indicate that Congress cannot bind itself by
statute to follow rules it would later like to change. So whom is Congress trying to fool here? The statute seems like an exercise in either
blind self-deception or clear-eyed public deception.
Some of the puzzles of expedited rescission can be solved when
one looks at prior experience under statutized rules. Congress has
passed many such statutes in the past, and for good reason. The reason is that they can work in practice despite their legal impotency.
My tentative assessment of the current proposal's practical effect is
that it would tend to work under the right institutional conditions, if
for reasons of partisanship as much as any principled belief that the
statutized rules legitimately demand adherence. Whether or not enacting an expedited rescission bill actually did any good on the
budget front-and there is reason to think it would not have a large
salutary effect-it would at least provide excellent opportunities for
exploring the practical impact of the increasingly common strategy of
managing congressional procedures through statutes rather than
through rules.
VI.

APPENDIX ONJUSTICIABILITY

In the main body of this Article, I contended that a court would
be unlikely to require Congress to comply with a statutized rule.' I
left that contention mostly unexplained, on the theory that most
readers would readily agree. In the following pages, I will explain
that conclusion in greater detail for those interested in this aspect of
the interaction between the legislature and the judiciary.
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See supra text accompanying note 63.
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To set up the justiciability analysis, let us first try to imagine the
substantive basis of a suit seeking to require legislative compliance
with expedited rescission procedures. One apparent problem with
any suit challenging Congress's decision not to follow the statutized
rules is the disclaimer clause that Congress would almost certainly include. That language, as noted earlier, says that either house may
change the statutized rules at any time and in the same way as any
other rule of that house (i.e., unilaterally).l 2 Further, even if the expedited rescission statute lacked that kind of disclaimer language, the
same power of each house to change the rules would follow, as I have
argued, as a matter of substantive constitutional law. There are, however, nonfrivolous merits arguments to the contrary. If the statute
lacked disclaimer language, a suit could charge that Congress was required to follow the statutory rules (which are, after all, written in
mandatory language) unless it formally amends the statute. And
whether or not there is a disclaimer clause in the statute, one could
argue that unilaterally changing the statutized rule is unconstitutional under INS v. Chadha, which states that "[a] mendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with" the requirements of bicameralism and presentment."'
With that view of the substance of the challenge in mind, let us
now consider whether a court could reach the merits.
A. Standing
To establish standing, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief." 4 That is a constitutionally required minimum for there to be a cognizable "case or controversy" under Article III; statutes can remove other, merely prudential barriers to standing, but they cannot abrogate the Article III
requirements.'5
A case challenging Congress's failure to follow rescission procedures stands on a much different footing from the case in which
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See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983). The short responses on the merits to the Chadhaargument are
(1) that a statutized rule could not, as a matter of constitutional law, purport to be binding in the first place, and/or (2) that regulating procedure (even in the form of a statute)
is not "legislative" activity subject to Chadha's requirements. See Bruhl, supra note 10, at
391-93, 413, 415 (discussing the impact of Chadha).
Allen v.Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-61, 571-78 (1992).

JOURNAL OF CONS TTIFONAL LA W

[Vol. 10:3

Congress does follow the procedures and approves a rescission. In
the latter situation, the beneficiaries of the now-cancelled program
suffer a fairly straightforward harm and would have Article III standing to sue under the reasoning of Clinton v. City of New York.' 6 Injured parties are harder to find in the case where Congress fails to
act, but candidates would include (1) private citizens claiming injury,
(2) aggrieved legislators, and (3) the President.1 7 None of these look
especially promising under conventional doctrines of standing.
1. Suits by PrivateParties
Citizens and taxpayers upset about Congress's failure to follow the
fast track rules, but with no individualized stake in the matter, would
almost certainly lack standing. The Supreme Court generally bars
citizens from suing to vindicate a generalized interest in having the
government follow the law and strictly limits taxpayer standing to the
narrowest situations, such as certain Establishment Clause violations. " '
Less clearly futile would be a suit brought by a person who would
have benefited had Congress voted to rescind an item targeted in the
President's special message. For instance, the President might have
proposed to eliminate a special tax subsidy that benefited the potential plaintiff's competitor. Injuries resulting from governmental decisions favoring competitors are often deemed sufficient to support
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524 U.S. 417, 429-36 (1998) (holding that parties affected by a cancelled program suffered a sufficiently direct injury to attain standing). Beyond the Article III requirements,
there is of course the problem of prudential standing and whether there needs to be a
statutory right to sue. In the 1996 Act, Congress expressly provided that "any individual"
adversely affected by the Act could sue for declaratory and injunctive relief. Line Item
Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 3, 110 Stat 1200, 1211 (1996); Clinton, 524 U.S. at
428.
Standing focuses on the plaintiff, but one might also question whether there are justiciability problems on the defendant side of the equation. After all, the Constitution's
Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, generally bars suits against legislators
based on their legislative conduct. However, the immunity can evidently be defeated by
naming the entire legislative body or its non-legislator officials as defendants. See Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 501-06 (1969); see also Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Filibuster,49 STAN. L. REv. 181, 238 (1997) ("At most the Speech and Debate Clause
prevents suits against individual members of Congress; no suit ever has extended it to
prevent suits against the government or the Senate as a whole."). The matter of the remedy that could be awarded in such a suit is discussed infra in text accompanying notes
153-56.
See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2568-70 (2007);
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 476-87 (1982); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1974).
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standing, especially where there is a statute broadly authorizing challenges by any aggrieved person."9 The Line Item Veto Act of 1996
contained a provision permitting any affected person to sue, but the
expedited rescission proposals do not. 20 Moreover, even if Congress
included a judicial review provision and eliminated all nonconstitutional barriers to suit, a competitor would still have great trouble satisfying the constitutional requirements of causation and redressability. Among other things, even if a plaintiff could secure an order
requiring Congress to vote on the rescission bill, that would not mean
Congress would
enact the rescission and thus cancel the competitor's
• 121
tax subsidy.
In fact, Congress's failure to hold a vote tends to suggest the opposite: that the rescission bill lacked the support necessary to pass.122
If so inclined, one could imagine more exotic ways to manufacture standing in disputes over congressional procedure. Recognizing
the difficulties associated with an institution trying to impose rules on
itself in the absence of any external enforcement,2 3 Congress could
attempt to create standing for an individual by creating a monetary
award for policing parliamentary violations. This would be somewhat
119
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For instance, in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970), the Supreme Court held that data processing companies had standing under the
Administrative Procedure Act's judicial review provision to challenge agency action permitting banks to enter the data processing market. See id. at 158. For background on the
development of competitor standing, see generally Monica Reimer, Comment, Competitive
Injury as a Basis for Standing in Endangered Species Act Cases, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 109, 114-27
(1995), and Note, Competitors' Standing To Challenge Administrative Action Under the APA,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 843 (1956).
See supra note 63. Note that the Administrative Procedure Act will not suffice to provide
for review here because Congress is not an "agency" whose actions are subject to judicial
review under the statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (2000).
For example, in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976),
the Court denied standing to indigent plaintiffs challenging an IRS ruling that allowed
tax-exempt hospitals to reduce the amount of care they provided indigents. The Court
reasoned that it was speculative whether a reversal of the IRS policy would cause plaintiffs
to receive care they desired, since a number of factors affected the hospitals' decisions.
Id. at 43-46.
To be sure, as a general matter the failure to hold a vote does not necessarily provide
strong evidence that a measure would not enjoy majority support if a vote were held. Because the legislative process contains so many vetogates, bills with majority support can
fail to come to a vote for many reasons. But the implication is much stronger under fast
track nles, since they eliminate many procedural roadblocks and produce a more majoritarian process.
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Legislatures as Rule-Followers, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH:
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE, supra note 74, at 475-76

("[R]eposing the power to modify or avoid rules in the same body allegedly constrained
by them is likely to produce far more frequent modification or avoidance than genuine
constraint....").
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along the lines of the bounty awarded to private plaintiffs for prosecuting frauds on the government under the qui tam provisions of the
False Claims Act.14 Would this work? In passing upon whether a qui
tam relator has standing, the Supreme Court said the following:
An interest unrelated to injury in fact is insufficient to give a plaintiff
standing. The interest must consist of obtaining compensation for, or
preventing, the violation of a legally protected right. A qui tam relator
has suffered no such invasion-indeed, the "right" he seeks to vindicate
does not even fully materialize until the litigation is completed and the
relator prevails. This is not to suggest that Congress cannot define new
legal rights, which in turn will confer standing to vindicate an injury
caused to the claimant. As we have held in another context, however, an
interest that is merely a "byproduct" of the suit itself cannot give rise to a
cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes.125

The Court nonetheless decided that a qui tam relator had standing
based on the theory that the United States had assigned part of its
own right to recover (assignees have standing under long-established
doctrine) and due to the long history of qui tam suits, which were
known at the Founding. 126 Neither the assignment theory nor the
long history is available in the case of the qui tam citizenparliamentarian, and so the legal case for standing is doubtful. And,
on a more practical note, it is unlikely that Congress would seek out
opportunities to let persons enforce its rules against it.
Let us turn next to the less exotic, though not necessarily more
promising, alternative of suits by legislators.
2. LegislatorStanding
The initial challenge to the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 was
brought by members of Congress who argued that the 1996 Act diminished the power of their votes and unconstitutionally shifted authority from Congress to the President. In Raines v. Byrd, the Supreme Court dismissed the case on the ground that the legislator
plaintiffs lacked standing. 12 Apart from its specific holding, Raines is
highly relevant because it reshaped the law of legislator standing by
giving an extremely narrow reading to the prior leading case uphold-
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31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)-(d) (2000). I credit Seth Barrett Tillman for suggesting a version of
this idea to me; I do not claim that my brief discussion of his idea explores all the nuances.
Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-73 (2000)
(footnote omitted).
Id. at 773-74.
521 U.S. 811,816, 821 (1997).
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28
ing legislator standing, Coleman v. Miller.1
In Coleman, state legislators brought suit claiming that state officials had unlawfully deemed
the state legislature to have ratified a proposed constitutional amendment by counting the deciding vote of the state lieutenant governor,
whom the legislators contended was not entitled to vote. 2 9 Coleman
was sometimes read rather expansively as a statement that legislators
have standing to vindicate institutional interests regarding the power
of their votes. According to the Raines Court, however, Coleman
"stands (at most) for the proposition that legislators whose votes
would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative
Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or
does not go into effect),
on the ground that their votes have been
30
completely nullified.'
If a legislator sues on the theory that the House or Senate violates
the law by not holding a vote on a rescission request, she cannot
really claim that her vote was "completely nullified." Rather, the problem is that she did not get the chance to vote at all; the opportunity to
vote has been nullified, perhaps. Given the Supreme Court's evident
distaste for the Coleman holding, that would be an uphill battle at
best.
The law on legislator standing is more fully developed in the D.C.
Circuit, and there, too, the best bet is that a legislator today would be
deemed to lack standing in the suit we are contemplating. To be
sure, the D.C. Circuit's rather expansive pre-Raines decisions may well
have upheld standing in this case on the theory that the denial of a
"voting opportunity" suffices to establish a legislator's standing. 13 '
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307 U.S. 433 (1939).
Id. at 436-37.
Raines, 521 U.S. at 823 (citation omitted). Legislators can still have standing in cases in

which they suffer some particularized personal injury, such as denial of their salary. See
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id. at 820-21 (discussing the holding of Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). But
here we are concerned with institutional injuries.
See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) ("To be cognizable
for standing purposes, the alleged diminution in congressional influence must amount to
a disenfranchisement, a complete nullification or withdrawalof a voting opportunity; and the
plaintiff must point to an objective standard in the Constitution, statutes or congressional
house rules, by which disenfranchisement can be shown." (emphasis added)), vacated on
other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); see also Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) ("[T]he office of United States Senator does confer a participation in the
power of Congress which is exercised by a Senator when he votes .... No more essential

interest could be asserted by a legislator. We are satisfied, therefore, that the purposes of
the standing doctrine are fully served.... ."); cf Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 117, at
234-36 (arguing, in a pre-Raines article, that a senator would have standing to challenge a
filibuster because it denies him the opportunity to vote); Lee Renzin, Note, Advice, Con-
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Thus, the D.C. Circuit held nearly three decades ago that legislators
had standing to challenge the President's unilateral termination of a
treaty on the ground that they were denied their (alleged) constitutional right to vote on whether the treaty should be terminated. 132 Yet
since Raines, the D.C. Circuit has tightened its law of standing.
Though none of the more recent decisions are directly on point, it
has ruled that executive actions that deprive legislators of an alleged
constitutional right
to vote on an issue generally do not suffice to
33
confer standing.1

In any event, what the D.C. Circuit gaveth under its formerly loose
doctrine of legislator standing, it often tooketh away through a doctrine of equitable discretion. The doctrine, rooted explicitly in the
separation of powers, generally denies jurisdiction when a legislator's
dispute does not involve an overreaching executive, but instead
represents a quarrel "primarily with his fellow legislators.' 3 4 That
doctrine counsels dismissal of, inter alia, "challenges concerning
congressional action or inaction regarding legislation., 13 5 Such a
challenge is what is involved here, and so equitable discretion would
probably doom a legislator's suit even if lack of standing did not.
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sent, and Senate Inaction-IsJudicialResolution Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1739, 1775 n.179
(1998) (reaching the same conclusion, even after Raines).
Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 701-03. The court went on to hold that the suit was nonetheless
nonjusticiable because it presented a political question. Cf Williams v. Phillips, 360 F.
Supp. 1363, 1366 (D.D.C. 1973) (upholding senators' standing where the President had
appointed an official allegedly in contravention of the need for a Senate vote consenting
to the nomination).
See, e.g., Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 113-17 (D.C. Cir. 1999). A district court
case applied Raines and Chenoweth to deny standing in a case in which legislators alleged
that the President's unilateral termination of a treaty deprived them of an opportunity to
vote on the matter, the same theory that had supported legislator standing in Goldwater.
See Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-11 (D.D.C. 2002).
While I focus in the text on the lack of constitutional standing-which would be sufficient to doom a legislator's suit-it is at least worth asking whether a legislator requires
a statutory right to sue. The cases, unfortunately, largely neglect this question. See Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show that
StandingDoctrine Is Lookingfor Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2261
n.101 (1999) (noting this same omission).
Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981); cf Harrington v.
Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dismissing for lack of standing and noting that
any restraints on legislators' activities came from House rules, not the Executive Branch).
Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881.
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3. Executive Standing
If the majority leader of one house failed to introduce the President's rescission approval bill or Congress otherwise failed to hold a
vote on it, could the President (or another executive official) sue to
require Congress to consider the President's bill? Needless to say,
Congress would certainly be wary of providing the President with a
right to sue it for failing to follow certain procedures. But it is not at
all clear that the executive needs statutory authority to sue in order to
uphold federal law.13 6 As for the constitutional requisites for standing, the President would seem to have a pretty good argument. Although we know that the mere fact of a failure to follow the law does
not create a cognizable injury for purposes of ordinary litigants, that
kind of abstract injury arguably is sufficient for the executive.3 7 And,
even apart from that general executive interest, certainly one could
make a common-sense case that the President suffers an honest-togoodness particularized
injury when Congress refuses to vote on his
38
rescission proposals.
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Several authors have written on the vexing question of the executive's ability to sue in the
absence of statutory authorization. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 789-93 (5th ed. 2003);
Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 65 (1993);
Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor,73 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 570 (2005); Larry W.
Yackle, A Worthy Champion for FourteenthAmendment Rights: The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 111, 127-48 (1997); Note, Nonstatutory Executive Authority to Bring
Suit, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1566 (1972).
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed"); Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 771 (2000) (stating that a violation of federal law constitutes an injury in fact to the
government, aside from any additional proprietary injury). That the executive does not
need a concrete and particularized injury in fact in order to sue is evident from criminal
prosecutions (among other things). See generally Hartnett, supra note 133.
One might think that there would be a causation or redressability problem here, inasmuch as there is no guarantee that Congress would enact the approval bill even if Congress properly considered it. Indeed the failure to hold a vote tends to suggest, if anything, that it would not pass. This was a problem for a private litigant seeking
competitor standing," see supra note 121 and accompanying text, but it might not be a
problem for the President. Whereas the private party's purported injury in fact was the
disadvantage stemming from the competitor's tax break or earmark, the President might
be able to characterize his injury as Congress's failure to consider his proposal as required by law. Cf Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007) (explaining that
persons who hold a procedural right that an agency engage in certain activity face lower
hurdles of redressability and immediacy); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 43334 n.22 (1998) ("[D]enial of a benefit in the bargaining process can itself create an Article III injury, irrespective of the end result."); Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am. v. City ofJacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (holding that a contractor has standing to challenge a discriminatory bidding process without proving that it
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Nonetheless, a suit by the President against the legislature presents a unique situation in which ordinary concepts of injury and
standing seem misplaced. Notably, in denying legislators standing in
Raines v. Byrd, the Court's opinion included a passage describing past
incidents in which Presidents might have attempted to sue Congress
to challenge enactments that allegedly interfered with executive prerogatives.1 9 In none of those cases was suit actually brought, so of
course none generated any holdings regarding standing, but the
Raines Court strongly implied that the reason for the absence of suits
was that those past Presidents would have lacked standing-which the
Court used to bolster its conclusion that the legislators before it likewise lacked standing. 40 That discussion of presidential standing,
though not strictly a holding, would no doubt be used to throw cold
water on a presidential suit that would embroil the courts in a dispute
between the branches over whether Congress was required to hold a
vote.
The Court's skeptical comments in Raines, while coming in the
context of a ruling denying standing, were obviously inspired by more
general concerns of separation of powers and justiciability. We thus
turn next to the somewhat amorphous political question doctrine,
which incorporates such considerations more directly.
B. Political Question
Any properly socialized lawyer will immediately recognize that a
suit challenging Congress's failure to follow fast track procedures
reeks of the type of political question that the courts are wary of deciding. One can easily imagine a court citing the Rules of Proceedings Clause-the mostly underappreciated bit of the Constitution
providing that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings"4"'-and deeming it the requisite "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department .... ,,14'And one could likewise envision the court citing as
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otherwise would have won the contract, because equal protection guarantees a right to
compete on equal terms).
See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,826-28 (1997).
See id. at 828 (observing that "[t]here would be nothing irrational about a system that
granted standing ....But it is obviously not the regime that has obtained under our Constitution to date.").
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.2.
The "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" is, of course, one of the indicia
of a political question famously listed in Baker v. Carr.
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a leading authority Nixon v. United States, which involved an impeached judge's complaint that the Senate had failed to follow correct impeachment procedures because it tasked a committee with the
job of inquiring into the judge's crimes, leaving to the full Senate
only the role of reviewing and voting to accept the committee's recommendation.
The impeached judge argued that this was improper because the Constitution directs that "[t] he Senate shall have
the sole Power to try all Impeachments,"' 44 but the Supreme Court instead cited that very language as evidence that the case presented a
45
political question textually committed to the Senate's judgment.1
Yet while the intuition that this is a political question is strong and
in all likelihood predictively sound, it is harder than one might have
thought to explain just why that result is correct. The reasoning in
the preceding paragraph is far too quick, on several counts.
To begin, while the power to establish and apply parliamentary
rules is textually committed to each chamber and is largely immune
from judicial second-guessing,146 that does not necessarily mean that
the political question doctrine always bars courts from passing upon
whether Congress has followed its parliamentary rules. As the Supreme Court said in United States v. Smith, "[when] the construction
to be given to the [Senate] rules affects persons other than members of the
Senate, the question presented is of necessity a judicial one.' 47 Smith

143
144
145

146
147

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
506 U.S. 224, 228-38 (1993).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (emphases added).
See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229-35.
See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932) (emphasis added); see alsoYellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114
(1963) ("It has been long settled, of course, that rules of Congress and its committees are
judicially cognizable."). For discussions of the justiciability of legislative rules, see generally JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY'S PRIVILEGED FEW:
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND
DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 49-67 (2007), John
C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of
Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 530-42 (2001), Michael B.
Miller, Comment, The Justiciabilityof Legislative Rules and the "Political"PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1990), and Gregory Frederick Van Tatenhove, Comment, A
Question of Power: JudicialReview of CongressionalRules of Procedure, 76 KY. L.J. 597 (1987).
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involved a situation in which the Senate purported to withdraw its
consent to a presidential appointment, which withdrawal arguably
violated the Senate's internal rules governing the appointments
process. In that dispute, there were obvious outsiders in the person
of the nominee/appointee Mr. Smith as well as the President (an
outsider vis-A.-vis the Senate, though not a mere private party) .14 In
our hypothetical lawsuit, the President or another litigant could argue that the case is justiciable because a 49
chamber's internal procedures negatively "affect" them as outsiders.
As further support for an argument in favor of justiciability, we
should keep in mind that it may be a mistake to consider this situation only in terms of the justiciability of disputes over parliamentary
rules. Here we are confronted with a statute that governs the proceedings. Thus, to return to the Nixon case discussed above, the
proper analogy would be a case where Congress had passed a statute
regulating impeachment procedures and mandating trial by the full
Senate. If the Senate then nonetheless permitted a committee to
conduct the inquiry, leaving the full body only to vote on the committee's recommendation, would the nonjusticiability holding in Nixon
still follow? The statute's requirements are certainly 'Judicially discoverable and manageable standards,"0 and there seems to be a
clear violation of them. Though there may be (again using Bakers
terminology) a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment"
of impeachment to the Senate,'15 does the Senate's nonjusticiable discretion become the stuff of judicial judgment when it is cabined and
crystallized into the form of a statute in the United States Code? Where
is there any problematic "lack of respect" 152 shown to Congress when a
court just requires Congress (like everyone else) to follow statutory
law?
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See Smith, 286 U.S. at 7-9.
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In Smith, the Senate's attempt to reconsider its consent to Smith's nomination would have
required action by outsiders (such as the President's rescission of Smith's commission or
Smith's resignation). See CHAFETZ, supra note 147, at 58 (reading Smith narrowly and relying on this feature). Here, in contrast, an outsider is trying to require action by the houses

based on their rules. This difference may weaken the case for justiciability. As my aim

150

here is not to establish justiciability, there is no need to pin down the precise scope of
cases such as Smith and Yellin.
Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

151

Id.

152

Id.

Mar. 2008]

RETURN OF THE LINE ITEM VETO?

Maybe the best support for the intuition of nonjusticiability stems
from the difficulty of fashioning a proper remedy.'-5 If congressional
leaders refuse to introduce the President's bill or schedule it for debate, how can the courts make them do so? Surely federal marshals
will not commandeer the Speaker's chair and force members to vote.
But once again the reality is somewhat more complicated. In Powell v.
McCormack, which concerned a congressman's challenge to the
House's refusal to seat him, the Supreme Court noted an argument
that federal courts could not issue injunctions compelling House
members to perform specific official acts. 4 But as the Court pointed
out, the difficulties inherent in injunctive relief did not bar a declaratory judgment, which Powell had also sought and to which the Court
deemed him entitled.155 So, too, here one could argue that a court
could issue a declaratory judgment stating that (assuming the challenge succeeded on the merits) Congress was required to hold a
vote.156 One would have to confront the risk that Congress would
simply ignore such ajudgment, regarding as audacious the judiciary's
attempt to meddle with its parliamentary processes. If the legislature
remained unmoved, the courts would likely be unwilling to go further. The risk of such disharmony
might provide a basis for deeming
7
the matter a political question.1

As in at least one other area of the law, it may be that the best that
can be said of why the suit we are contemplating would be a political
question is that one knows it when one sees it. 15 While the doctrinal
153

See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1992)
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relief" as a factor supporting the conclusion of nonjusticiability).
395 U.S. 486, 517 (1969).
Id. at 517-18, 550.
In a notable state decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently held

(citing "the difficulty of fashioning

that it lacked authority to enter injunctive or declaratory relief requiring the state legisla-

ture to vote on a proposed constitutional amendment banning gay marriage.
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Doyle v.

Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 858 N.E.2d 1090, 1095 (Mass. 2006). The court nonetheless
strongly expressed its view that the legislators had a constitutional duty to vote on the
measure before the end of the legislature's term. Id. at 1093. The legislature later voted
on the proposal on the last day of its term, with some people on both sides citing the
court's strongly worded exhortation as a decisive factor. See Frank Phillips & Lisa Wangsness, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Advances: Lawmakers OK Item for Ballot, But Hurdle Remains,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 2007, at Al.
If it were thought necessary to put this concern into the Baker language, it might be expressed as "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question."
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
But see ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION 146 (4th ed. 2003) (observing that the Baker criteria

"seem useless in identifying what constitutes a political question").
158

Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be [hard-core por-
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analysis is less certain than one might expect, this situation has political question written all over it. In my view, Congress would be well
advised to consider itself immune from judicial
correction if it failed
59
to follow the statutory fast track procedures.1
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nography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it
when I seeji. . .
There has been at least one case in which a plaintiff sued over Congress's alleged failure
to follow a framework law. The case involved the Alaskan Natural Gas Transportation Act
(ANGTA). That statute provided that Congress could, upon the President's recommendation, pass a resolution waiving certain regulatory requirements governing pipeline construction, but it also dictated that neither house could consider such a waiver resolution
within sixty days of considering any other resolution concerning the same waiver recommendation. See Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1284-87 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The
House of Representatives nonetheless considered two such waiver resolutions on successive days, and then several congressmen, state officials, and consumer advocates sued,
contending, inter alia, that the waiver was enacted in violation of ANGTA's sixty-day rule.
Id. The D.C. Circuit held this challenge nonjusticiable, but that ruling is limited in several important respects. First, as the D.C. Circuit opinion recognized, the case really involved an application of the rule that courts will not look behind the procedures by which
a statute is enacted in order to try to "undo" a statute, so long as the statute complies with
the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment. See id. at 1287
("[Miost questions involving the processes by which statutes.., are adopted [are]
[p]olitical in nature .... " (third brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672-73 (1892) (holding that the
courts could not question whether the enrolled bill signed by the President was the same
text on which each chamber had actually voted). A suit challenging the failure to hold a
vote would not run afoul of that rule. Second, the D.C. Circuit's decision was also driven
by the fact that ANGTA itself contained disclaimer language stating that "either House
[may] change the rules (so far as those rules relate to the procedure of that House) at
any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of
such House." Metzenbaum, 675 F.2d at 1286-87. Before voting on the second resolution,
the House first passed a special rule temporarily amending ANGTA's special procedures.
Id. at 1286. Thus, while the court justified its holding in terms of its reluctance to judge
compliance with the House's internal rules, the decision would make just as much sense
as a holding that Congress had in fact complied with the statute by taking advantage of this
loophole.

